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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
National defence and security have been the supreme 
concern of Israel since its inception. Israel's purpose is 
seen in a broad sense in its existence as a Jewish state 
whose survival helps to ensure the future of the Jewish 
people in addition to the survivial of Israel and Israelis. 
Israel continues to see the Arab-Israeli Conflict in stark 
terms - it is a war of survival, a fight for existence, in 
the face of the Arab call for the destruction of the state. 
Since its establishment,Israel fought five wars with Arabs 
and was victorious in almost all of them but victory brought 
no peace - not then, not since. On the contrary, the 
unexpected success only stimulated its defeated enemies to 
try to husband better their superior military resources with 
a view to another round and another, which signaled the 
beginning of a confrontation that has still not ceased and 
thus has led the arms proliferation in the region in general 
and in Israel in particular. 
The present study, "Israel and Arms Proliferation" 
is divided into five chapters including conclusions, high-
lighting the magnitude of the problems as perceived by the 
policy makers in Israel and the other related issues that 
have caused the arms proliferation in the region. First 
(iv) 
Chapter deals with the Israel's security doctrine. The all-
encompassing nature of war in Israel and the centrality of 
security to national existence has been the first and fore-
most aim of every Israeli citizen. All aspects of life in 
Israel directly or indirectly relate to national survival 
and security. Security is perceived as a central value and 
is of a decisive consideration in the shaping of Israel's 
foreign policy which becomes an extension of national 
defence policy. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the 
security perceptions of Israel in relation to its bordering 
states. 
Second Chapter deals with the process which led to 
the impressive evolution of military industry in Israel. 
After the establishment of the state, the role and status of 
the growing defence establishment became a central issue in 
political life, especially in the wake of wars. It also 
deals with the institutional linkages between the defence 
establishment and civilian sectors. The defence establish-
ments have played a very important role in Israeli society 
and have a major impact on its political, economic and 
social fabric during the last forty-six years of its 
existance. In the case of military assistance and in 
weapons transfers, important documentation is not si-ply 
available. Our sources, which we cite, are all public and 
(v) 
unclassified. The mere absence of normalized diplomatic 
ties with Israel is not allov7ed to stand in the way of a 
useful arms supply relationship. Again, Israel's reputation 
of late as a serious competitor in the exceptionally 
competitive areas of international weapons transfers. The 
present study, for the sake of perspective, begins by 
offering three primary explanations for the Israeli 
emphasis on defence sales: (a) political incentives, (b) 
security motives, and (c) economic, commercial and trade 
benefits. Their interlocking perspectives constitute a 
powerful argument for utilizing military exports on behalf 
of what Israelis and their leaders see and define as the 
vital national interest. 
The third chapter deals with the 'U.S. - Israeli 
Connection' for defence and strategic reasons. Israel's 
geographic location, along with its military facilities, 
offers the United States a good base, should intervention in 
the Arabian Peninsula be necessary. The relationship 
between the two countries provides opportunity to United 
States to control or influence in a high fluid region of 
great strategic and economic importance; for Israel they 
involved its very existence and national security in an 
immediate sense. In addition, the intensity of the inter-
action between the two have been due to a special factor in 
(vi) 
the American - Israeli relationship relating to the charac-
ter of Israel as a democratic, Jewish, immigrant, belea-
guered state and to the fact that some 6 million American 
Jews have developed a passionate interest in Israel's 
security and well-being. This "special connection" has 
secured for Israel a modicum of American support (including 
massive arms supply) even when that seemed to be a burden on 
the perceived American political-strategic interests, and has 
encouraged a higher level of support when Israel seemed to 
be playing a useful role in the context of the perceived 
American "real" interest. 
Fourth chapter covers indepth magnitude of 
Civil-Military relations. The protracted Arab-Israeli war 
and the centrality of security to Israel have given a major 
role to senior military personnel in Israeli politics and 
public life in general. Since the attainment of statehood 
in 1948 state control over the military has been weaker 
than commonly perceived. Instead of state control, a unique 
pattern of civil-milit=ry partnership exists. This relation-
ship reflects the inner rivalries of Israel's party 
politics. Clashes and accommodations between various 
coalitions of politicians and military leaders occurred 
throughout the changing Governments from Ben Gurion to 
Begin. Analysis of the decision making process with regard 
to conflict management and its consequences is one of the 
major sources of understanding of civil-military relations. 
CHAPTER - I 
ISRAEL'S SECURITY DOCTRINE 
Israel is essentially a creation of Zionist move-
ment. This ideological movement is closely linked to the 
wave of nationalism that has swept the world since the 
American and French Revolutions, and has given rise to over 
one hundred independent nations in the last quarter of the 
20th century. However, Zionism cannot, indeed, be understood 
apart from its origin in the political, social, and 
intellectual currents that washed Europe in the nineteenth 
century and were the common source of many nationalist 
movements. Zionism endeavoured to obtain national 
sovereignty for a people scattered throughout the world in a 
land it had not effectively occupied for nearly two thousand 
years. 
While Zionism provided the leadership and drive and 
mobilized the resources for overall Jewish endeavour in 
Palestine, the entire undertaking would have been impossible 
had Britain not sponsored the Zionist movement at the end of 
first world war and given it the opportunity to establish a 
secure base in the country through the Balfour Declaration 
and the r.andate. On November 2, 1917 British Foreisn 
Secretary Arthur J. Balfour wrote a letter to Lord 
Rothschild, the head of the Zionist Organisation in Great 
Britain: 
"His Majesty's government view with 
favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a natiobnal home for the Jewish people, 
and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this 
object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice 
the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine or the rights and political 
status enjoyed by Jews in any other 
country".1 
Here arisesa question, why British Government issued 
the Balfour Declaration. One of the immediate reasons was to 
help keep Russia in the war. Russia was then in the throes 
of revolution in which Jews played a prominent part, and the 
British cabinet hoped that the declaration might provide an 
incentive to the Russian Jews to exert their influence 
against their country's pulling out of the fighting. Second 
immediate reason was a desire to counter the apathy of a 
considerable sections of American Jewry towards the war. 
Third immediate reason was the expectation of reaping some 
propaganda benefits in all the countries where Jews lived, 
Henry Cattan, "Palestine, The Arabs and Israel": 
The Search for Justice. Longman, William Clowes and 
Sons, Great Britain. London and Beccles, 1969, 
pp. 18-19. 
and a fourth was the desire to forestall an expected German 
declaration in favour of the Jews. Apart from these 
possible reasons, there was also the response of some imagi-
native British minds to the suggestion that a large-scale 
Jewish settlement in Palestine might have a stabilizing 
influence in an area vrhere important British interests were 
at stake. In short, the declaration was issued out of a 
range of considerations, for supposed immediate tactical 
political advantages, and for the perceived long range 
strategic interests - an irresistible combination to any 
imaginative Anglo-Saxon statesman. 
On April 25, 1920, the Allied Suprerne Council 
allocated the mandate over Palestine to Great Britain, and 
on July 22, 1922, Great Britain was formally confirmed as 
mandatory power by the Council of League of Nations. The 
mandate expressly provided for a Jewish national home in 
Palestine, incorporating into its text, almost verbatism, 
the Balfour Declaration. The mandatory power was to be 
responsible for the development of self-governing insti-
tutions. Article 4 dealt with the recognition of a Jewish 
agency to cooperate wiih the mandatory power in establishing 
a Jewish national home. It added that "the Zionist organi-
zation shall be recognized as such an agency." Article 6 
imposed upon the mandatory power the duty of facilitating 
Jewish immigration and land settlement, "while ensuring that 
the rights and position of other sections of population are 
not prejudiced." Soon after the British mandate of 
Palestine, the Jewish immigration started to this land. But 
rise of Hitler to power in Germany suddenly increased in the 
rate of Jewish immigration which caused the resentment of 
Arabs. Although this immigration gave a fillip to the 
economic life of the country from which every body 
benefitted, the Arabs ,however,became fearful of the prospect 
that the Jews might soon become a majority in the country. 
As a sop to their apprehensions, the ftilestine government 
suggested in 1936 the formation of a legislative council in 
which Arabs could outnumber Jews. But the scheme was 
severely criticised in the British Parliament and withdra^-m; 
whereupon the Arabs initiated a recistance movement which 
soon assumed the character of an open, all-out revolt 
against British authority. 
In 1937 a Royal Commission was sent to inquire and 
make recommendations, did not content itself with 
suggesting new restrictions, but reached the drastic 
conclusion that the mandate itself was altogether "unwork-
able". The Commission suggested partition: n^ Palestine into an 
2. George Lenczowski,"Middle East in World Affairs", 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1962, 
p. 376. 
Arab and a Jewish state and a British zone. Arabs rejected 
the scheme outright, the Jews accepted the principle of 
partition and the British government sent another Commission 
to workout the details of partition which concluded that 
partition was impracticable. 
On May 17, 1939, the British Government issued a 
White Paper, which laid down new principles concerning 
Palestine. Reversing its former policy, the Government 
proposed the creation, within ten years, of an independent 
Palestinian state to be linked with Britain by a special 
treaty. The most important provision concerned immigration 
and land transfers. Cn both points Britain virtually gave 
way to Arab demands: Jewish immigration was to be limited 
to 75,000 for the next five years, after which it was to 
cease altogether, and Palestine was to be divided into three 
zones - the first, in which land transfers fron Arabs to 
Jews were to be allowed, the second, in which they were to 
be restricted, and the third, in which they were to be 
3 
forbidden. 
These proposals were rejected by Arab spokesmen 
because they did not go far enough, however, the Arabs had 
scored a considerable victory at this juncture. The 
Ibid., pp. 384-385 
Zionists were profoundly shocked and promptly denounced the 
White Paper as a betrayal of promises and appeasement to 
the Arabs. The Permanent Mandate Commission of League of 
Nations also voiced its criticism declaring an incompati-
bility existing between the paper and the terms of the 
4 
mandate. 
The announcement of White Paper policy, which put 
limitations on Jews for their migration to Palestine, turned 
the whole movement into agitation. The dissident groups 
extended their acts of terror. "The Haganah (the under-
ground arny under the authority of the Yishuv leadership) 
engaged in sabotage and brought in numerous unauthorised 
immigrant ships; and the British responded with hangings, 
martial law, curfew, arrest of Yishuv leaders, and deporta-
tion of illegal immigrants to camps in Cyprus and even back 
to Germany. When the last device - an Arab - Jewish -
British Conference - collapsed, the harassed British 
Government finally decided on april 2, 1947, to place the 
whole felestine issue suqarely in the hand of a special 
assembly of the United Nations." Seven months later the 
4. Ibid., p. 385. 
5. Nadav Safran, "Israel - The Embattled Ally", The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and London, England, 1978, p.31. 
regular session of the United Nations adopted a well-known 
resolution to partition Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish 
state. But due to the hindrance put by Britain and because 
of Aral)s and Jewish resistence, the U.N. resolution could 
not be implemented. 
On December 1, 1947, soon after the U.N. General 
Assembly passed the partition resolution, fighting in 
Palestine started between the Arabs and Jews. The fighting 
spread all over the country which continued for the next 
five and a half months. On May 15, 1948 when the state of 
Israel was proclaimed by the leadership of the triumphant 
Yishuv, the regular forces of Egypt, TransJordan, Syria, 
Lebanon and Iraq crossed the boundaries of Palestine and 
turned the civil war between Jews and Palestinians into an 
international war between newly born state of Israel and 
its neighbours. The war lasted formally for nearly eight 
months, until Egypt agreed on January 7, 1949, to enter into 
armistice negotiations. 
Israel - Security Perceptions: 
The main problem of Israel's existence is security 
due to geo-strategic situation and its conflict with hostile 
Arab neighbours. Thus its policy makers' prominent concern 
6. Ibid., p. 44. 
8 
is national survival and security. According to David Ben 
Gurion the first Prime Minister of Israel, "The security of 
Israel is not a matter of protection, the independence, 
territory, borders, or sovereignty, but it is a matter of 
survival." In the first thirty two years of its existence 
it fought five wars (1948-49, 1956, 1967, 1969-70, 1973) 
with the Arab states and still remains technically, if not 
actually, at war with all but Egypt. Israel has a large 
standing army. It spends major portion of GNP and budget 
on its defence and defence related items. Shimon Peres, 
the former Prime Minister has defined security of Israel: 
"The security of Israel implies immig-
ration, and it means settlements. 
Security includes control of the sea and 
the air....Security is the development of 
scientific research and scientific 
aptitude in all disciplines, physics, 
chemistry, biology and advanced 
technology. The security of Israel is the 
mobilization of our youth and the 
involvement of the people and its 
scholars in the pursuit of difficult and 
vital objectives. Settlement, defence and 
integration of the exiles. Security is 
not a limited function but a multiple 
effort; it is like a high-tension cable 
concentrating national energy and using 
it to reinforce the nation's ability to 
survive. It is both existing energy and 
potential energy." 8 
7. Ghazi Rababah, "The Israeli Strategy: 1964-1980", 
Al-ianar, Zarka, Jordan, 1984, p. 410. 
8. Yoram Peri, "Between Battles and Ballots": Israeli 
Military in Politics. Cambridge University Press, 
Canibridge, London, 19S3, p. 24. 
The hostile attitude of Arab countries towards 
Israel dominates directly or indirectly, all aspects of 
Israeli life, and it has prevailed since 1948 when it 
declared its independence and was attacked and even its 
existence was threatened by Arab countries. According to 
Barnard Reich, "The holocaust, Arab hostility during the 
mandate period, five wars, countless skirmishes and 
terrorist attacks, and incessant vituperative rhetoric 
against the state have all left their mark on Israel's 
national psyche and perceptions, but have not led to a 
comprehensive, permanent, and meaningful peace." The Arabs 
anti Israeli feelings vere further shown when they refused to 
join Sadat's peace process and in Khartoum Arab Summit in 
1967 where they declared "no peace with Israel, no recog-
nition of Israel, no negotiation with it, and insistence on 
the rights of Palestinian people". 
The position of Israel is also affected due to its 
surrounding hostile states and access to its land is only by 
9. Bernard Reich, 'Israel', Edited by Edward A. 
Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy "Security Policies 
of Developing Countries", Lexington Books, D.C. 
Heath & Company, Lexington Toronto, 1982, p. 203. 
10. Ibid. , p. 204. 
10 
sea and air. This geographically isolation prevented Israel 
for any kind of regional alliance system. In none of the 
five wars it fought between 1948 and 1981, was Israel joined 
in combat by another state - with the exception of the extra 
regional powers like Britain and France in 1956. 
The vulnerability of Israel is largely affected by 
its geographical setting. The frontiers which existed 
before June 1967 war could have been attacked easily by its 
enemy and it was difficult to defend populated areas. The 
distance between Israel's Mediterranean coast and enemy 
military installations in the West Bank, which included the 
coastal corridor between the main port city of Haifa and the 
commercial centre of Tel Aviv, was often less than ten 
miles. At its widest point near the Negev town of Dirnona, 
Israel's territory was only sixty-five miles wide. In most 
locations there were no major natural defence barriers to 
the advance of enemy forces. Israel's population centres, 
particularly its three major cities of Jerusalem (the Jewish 
sector), Tel Aviv, and Haifa and main air bases were within 
a few hours advance by enemy ground forces, and many were 
within enemy artillary range. This helped to generate a 
perception of vulnerability that has been important in 
shaping Israel's view of the significance of the occupied 
territories - that Israel must not return to the 
11 
vialnerability created by the pre-June 1967 war frontiers. 
In this connection Martin Van Creveld has claimed that 
Israel's security has two meanings: "First, the ability of 
individual Israeli citizens to work, travel and sleep 
without being bombed by terrorists or shelled from across 
the border. Second, security means dealing with the 
perceived threat to Israel's existence as a state and as a 
nation." 
For Israel, this combination of its historical -
psychological perspective, anti-semitism, geographic and 
political - military isolation, and vulnerability to enemy 
attack has conditioned the formulation of its security 
policies. The perceived threat to Israel compel it to 
formulate its security policies in a broader sense as 
prevention of threat to its independence and territorial 
integrity and a protectorate of persecuted Jews every where 
in the world. 
The Israelis perceive the threat only from the side 
of Arab states which share borders with her plus Iraq and 
not extraregional in nature. However, the entire Arab 
11. Ibid. , p. 205. 
12. Martin V. Creveld, The Making of Israel's Security, 
in Stephame G. Nevman (ed.), "Defence Planning in 
Less Industrialized States", Lexington Book Torento, 
1984, p. 115. 
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entity is considered in broader conception as the enemy 
because they are participating in taking the decisions 
against Israel in Arab League and propagate anti-Israeli 
feelings and sometimes participated in wars, terrorist acts 
etc. Before its disintegration, Soviet threat and potential 
was also a matter of concern for Israel but this was to be 
dealt by United States and Western powers not by Israel 
alone. 
The ruling elites of Israel consider the neighbours 
threat as serious as they think that the goal of Arab 
countries are not to annihilate the state as a political 
entity but they want to destroy the entire Jewish popula-
tion. The Israeli security is estimated on 'a worse case 
analysis', which considers that if Arab countries would be 
victorious it would be the destruction of the state of 
Israel. As Ben Gurion has stated: "Israel may win a hundred 
battles, yet its problems will not be solved but if the 
13 Arabs are victorious only once as it will mean our end." 
Israel realized the fact that they could not 
compete their enemy in quantity, thus she wanted to ensure a 
qualitative edge over them. Israel wanted to reduce the 
13. Moshe Dayan, "Story of My Life", Williai: Morrow and 
Co., Inc., New York, 1976, p. 441. 
13 
losses of life and expenditure during the time of war 
because a small state can not afford it. To achieve this 
goal, Israel wanted a short war and the use of advanced 
weapons. For their security and strategic purposes Israelis 
captured a large territory of Arabs. 1967 war provided 
Israel a defensible and secure borders. Israel wanted to 
expand its population or immigrants to the occupied 
territories for its security reasons. 
Further, Israel in response to the Arab threat 
developed a strong army relative to its population, size and 
resources. The airforce of Israel is considered to be the 
most important fighting element. Though less in number 
comparing it to the Arab forces, Israeli airforce is 
indisputably superior since the 1967 war when within few 
hours of combat it destroyed the whole unit of Egyptian air-
force which changed the position of ground war in Sinai 
zone. During the War of Attrition 1969-70, air-forces of 
Israel played an important role both in air-to-air combat 
and in its unique function as flying artilary against the 
Egyptian West Bank installations. In 1970 it raided the 
main Egyptian population and commercial centres. 
The ground forces of Israel are the largest and 
central part of Israeli Defence Force (IDF). The ground 
14. Bernard Reich, Op. cit., p. 209. 
14 
forces are expected to play a decisive role in war time 
against their enemies as it did in 1956 and 1967 war. IDF 
is expected to meet the identified threat and to defend the 
country from enemy. Due to these purposes, Israel acquires 
military weapons in quantity and quality from foreign 
countries, mostly the United States, France, England and 
West Germany and developed the substantial capability of 
defence production. It also captured a good quantity of 
Soviet arms in June 1967 war from the enemy Arab forces. 
Israel has also been providing military and 
financial support to the minority groups of the neighbouring 
countries so that they could remain engaged within the 
country and could not unite against it. For example, 
Israel was supporting the Biafran revolt in Nigeria, 
supported the Christian forces of Major Haddad in South 
Lebanon and the militants in the north. It also supported 
Kurds in Iraq and the Southern Sudanese against the Arab-
Muslim dominated northern based government. 
Israel also followed the retaliation policy for her 
security. It believes that if there is any threat for the 
15. Ibid., pp. 210-11. 
16. Ibid., p. 211. 
15 
security of Israel from any country it will not hesitate to 
punish then. Israelis believe that any potential threat to 
the security of Israel should be dealt before it becomes a 
real threat. On 7 July, 1981, the Israeli air-forces 
bombarded the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tamuz near Baghdad 
(operation was naned Babylone). This operation was done 
1000 kms inside the Arab territory. Again, in October 1985, 
the air forces of Israel bombed the PLO Headquarters and the 
home of several PLO officials which was 2000 kms away in 
Tunis. 
Israel has acquired the nuclear capability which has 
a good deterrent effect and might be used against the Arabs 
when it will feel that the very existence of Israel is in 
danger. A nuclear weapon can destroy a major Arab popula-
tion or resources centres such as Aswan Dam on the Nile, 
the Suez Canal, and cities such as Cairo, Alexandria, 
Damascus and Baghdad. Israelis also believe that possession 
of nuclear weapons by them will stabilize the situation in 
the region. Having the idea that nuclear weapons would give 
a sufficient feeling of security to the Israeli people, the 
Ministry of Defence developed the atomic energy programme 
within its system of 'blanket security'. 
17. L. Beaton & J. Modox, "The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons", Chatto and King, London, 1962, p. 171. 
16 
Foreign Policy of Israel: A Strategic Point of View: 
Since its establishment the state of Israel has 
followed the policy of national self-interest and its right 
to exist as an independent nation state. Thus the govern-
ment and people of Israel from the very beginning wanted 
to achieve three main objectives: 
1. Providing for the continued security and integrity 
of the state. 
2. Promoting massive immigration of Jews from all parts 
of the world,and 
3. Promoting rapid economic development of the 
18 
country. 
Israelis were well aware of the fact that their 
national objective can be achieved only by establishing 
final peace with their neighbours and developing good 
relations with the big powers specially United States and 
the Soviet Union. The threat from the Arab States compelled 
Israel to seek closer relation with the United States. 
Further the U.S. effort to win the support of some Arab 
countries impelled Soviet Union to play a role in the region 
by providing arms to some Arab countries to enhance their 
18. Nadav Safran, Op. cit., p. 334. 
17 
capacity to face Israel. "Once the Israeli government 
realised that the Arab states were unwilling or unable to 
make, peace, it directed its main foreign policy efforts 
elsewhere, confining itself to an "Arab Policy" that 
amounted to the sporadic assertion of a few principles and 
an attempt to convey by word and deed certain inpressions of 
its attitude. It reiterated endlessly its readiness to 
discuss peace with no prior conditions, and at the same time 
it sought to impress the Arabs with Israel's strength and 
determinations by reacting fiercely against any "encroach-
ment" upon the security and territorial integrity of the 
19 
country". 
Thus, the prevailing attitude of Israel seemed to be: 
"Talk peace as if you were not acting tough, and act tough 
as if you were not talking peace". Before 1967 the tough 
stand taken by Arab countries for peace compelled Israel for 
a realistic policy aimed at securing peace but it is not 
clear that the effort made by Israel were enough for detente 
and for peace. For example, in November 3, 1955, BenGurian 
invited Nasser for peace and at the same tine Israeli troops 
on 
captured Egyptian outpost in Sabha. 
19. Ibid., p. 337. 
20. Ibid., pp. 337-338 
18 
In 1953, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
wanted the principal countries of the West Asia to formulate 
a new out-look towards their foreign policies. The Truman 
administration wanted to unite the area against the 
communist pressure and possible aggression through a 
regional defence organization linked to the West. Instead 
of including all the areas, Dulles first wanted to unite 
"northern tier" and then gradually drawing the others, that 
ultimately resulted in the formation of a Central Treaty 
Organization which was later known as Baghdad Pact.-
Israel's anxiety about its security prospects in the 
face of these developments was sharpened by the simul-
tanious deterioration of its position through an other chain 
of events connected with Egypt. In July,1952, a new regime 
had came into existence there in the wake of a military 
coup, which brought to the power a junta of young officers. 
Again, the conclusion of arms agreement between Egypt and 
Russia in September 1955, which had an anti-western impli-
cation in the region, was also severely criticised by 
Israel. 
Due to its limited economic and human resources 
and given regional tension, Israel has tended to pursue a 
21. Ibid., p. 349. 
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22 dual strategy. On the regional level, Israel has sought 
to prevent collective Arab action, the primary goal being 
the de-coupling of Egypt, the most powerful Arab state, 
from the rest of the Arab world. On the international level, 
Israel sought strong and durable ties with the United 
States. At the best, Israel wanted to project an image of 
itself in the Arab world as an extention of the United 
States, and, therefore, as having unlimited resources. To 
attain the latter objective, Israel could not simply rely on 
Washington's traditional commitment and domestic lobbies so 
it sought an indispensable role in U.S. international 
strategy. As a result, any potential West Asian competitor 
seeking an alliance with the United States was perceived as 
a threat, thus Israel tried to prevent closer strategic ties 
between the United States and Arab States. 
The main thrust of Israeli foreign policy is 
assurance of its survival while maintaining her relations 
with out side powers. There are all visible evidences 
available for its expansionist policy, which again is 
Israel's commitment to the Zionist ideology and is discer-
nible in a substantial way in her foreign policy framework. 
Even the moderate members of MAPAI, a Labour Party 
22. Shibley Telhami, "Israeli Foreign Policy: A Static 
Strategy in a Changing world". Middle East Journal, 
Summer 1990, Vol. 44, No.3, p. 400. 
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predecessor, have been interested in the expansionist policy 
from the early days of statehood. To put it more cogently 
according to Telhami, "Nonetheless, given Israel's limited 
resources, its tense relationships with Arab states, and the 
Palestinian issue, much of Israeli foreign policy can be 
explained by its objective of self-preservation. In stating 
this argument, the dominant role of domestic political 
considerations that are mostly unrelated to strategic 
interests should not be under-estimated. Israel's dominant 
strategic interests, however, have driven Israeli policy 
into predictable patterns; sometimes this policy is 
conciously linked to strategic calculations, and sometimes 
subconciously. Domestic factors account for some excep-
tions; but this focusses on the general inclinations in 
23 Israeli policy that are based on strategic concerns". 
In its first three decades Israel followed a policy 
of deterrence towards her neighbouring West Asian countries. 
The main factor in Israeli deterrence strategy has been its 
offensive military policy in which air force played very 
important role as it had less man power and supposed to do 
efficient job. June 1967 war was its excellent exanple. 
Israel wanted to cause great injury and pain on its 
23. Ibid. , p. 401. 
21 
opponent than face the challenge from them. When Egypt and 
Syria attacked Israeli forces in 1973, indicating a failure 
of Israeli deterrence, an editor of Israeli newspaper 
Ma'arive wrote: 
"Our counter attack must be so fierce, 
so crushing, so pitiless and cruel that 
it causes a veritable national trauma in 
the collective conciousness of the Arabs; 
their Yom Kippur adventure must cost the 
Arabs so dear that the mere thought of 
new adventures makes them tremble with 
fear....we must strike a blow that 
exceeds all reason, so that the Arab 
people's instinct of self-preservation 
makes them accept Israel".24 
Thus the reckless use of force is highly undesir-
able because extensive use of force destroys resources and 
reduces deterrence capabilities. A state, whose policy is 
deterrence, should not invite challenges but when 
challenged, it should respond forcefully. 
Thus, the single objective of Israel's foreign 
policy can be stated in quite concrete terms. It is to 
mobilize all the resources of diplomacy for the protection 
and preservation of Israel as it is. This is no different, 
of course, from the basic objective of the foreign policy of 
any other state. Moreover,few specific reasons are offered 
24. Ibid. , p. 402: see also Ma'arive, October 9, 1973. 
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in support of earlier objectives mentioned above. First, 
all Jews who desire to make their home in Israel must be 
able to do so "in full human dignity" and with freedom of 
movement. Second, as a result of the untenable position in 
which Jews have found themselves in many European lands, 
Israel can not be indifferent to their plight. Third, 
Israel must exist as a vital spiritual and cultural link 
between itself and the Jewish communities of the world. 
Fourth, the state exists to provide for the resettlement of 
many Diaspora jews. 
To achieve these goals, Israel wanted to project 
herself as a main supporter for the Western and the U.S. 
interests in the West Asia. The reason of Israeli attack of 
Egypt in 1956 was that Nasser had the capability to lead and 
unite the Arab States. Just before the start of the Suez 
war, Egypt had concluded a tripartite agreement with Jordan 
and Syria for a unified command of three armies under Egypt. 
So, when Nasser challenged the European powers by 
nationalising Suez Canal, Israel along with France and 
Britain came out openly to oppose this move by challenging 
25. R.D. Mc Laurin, Mohammad Mughisuddin and Abraham R. 
Wanger, "Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East": 
Domestic Influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel 
and Syria, Praeger Publisher, U.S.A., 1977, p.205. 
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and restricting the position of Egypt in the eyes of other 
West Asian countries. Just after the Suez war the entire 
scene in West Asian politics was dramatically changed. 
However, the anti West attitude of the Arabs and the rising 
popularity of Nasser forced the United States to play a more 
vital role in the area. 
Arab-Israel war of 1956 and 1967, which was 
strategically very important for Israel, put her in a very 
strong position. Period between 1967 and 1973 was 
relatively easy one in terms of its relations with the 
United States. However, the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Egypt in 1972 created a tension in U.S.-Israeli 
relations because Egypt made herself available for U.S. as 
an ally in the region. Former Israeli Defence Minister Ezer 
Weizman put it thus, "In driving out the Russians from Egypt 
(Sadat) brought the West closer to him, necessarily 
diluting its loyalty to us. His compaign was successful 
costing us our position as the cosseted goodchild of the 
Western World. Our political situation went from bad to 
worse".^^ 
Egypt was taken seriously only after 1973 war in 
which its performance was impressive and its capability to 
26. Ezer Weizman, "The Battle for Peace", New York, 
Bantora Books 1981, p. 18. 
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unite Arab states for oil embargo against the West was 
suddenly realised. Further, Anwar Sadat's acceptance of 
unilateral mediation by the United States with Israel, also 
resulted in the improvement of U.S.-Egyptian relation. 
Carter administration also favoured close relation with 
Egypt because it gave less importance to the strategic 
27 issues than economic interests in the Persian Gulf. But 
this did not reduce the Israeli importance in the U.S. 
administration due to several political and strategic 
reasons at home and abroad as this view later culminated in 
the signing of the "memorandum of strategic understanding" 
between Israel and United States in November, 1981. 
The peace initiative welcomed by Sadat posed a 
dilemma for Israel on two counts: on the one hand, her long 
term regional objective was within reach: a bilateral 
agreement between Egypt and Israel would simultaneously 
neutralize Egypt as a military threat and cause division in 
the Arab world. On the other hand, the agreement would 
result in closer U.S.-Egyptian ties that could lead to a 
weakening of the U.S. commitment to Israel. As noted by 
Israeli Defence Minister Weizraan, "My objections to 
excessive American involvement in the negotiations with 
28. Shibley Telhanii, Op. cit. , p. 410. 
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Egypt stemmed from a simple consideration: I foresaw that 
U.S. interests lay closer to Egypt's than to ours, so that 
it would not be long before Israeli negotiators would have 
to cope with the dual confrontation as they faced a 
28 Washington/Cairo axis". This not only meant that the U.S. 
participation in the negotiation would be favourable to 
Egypt but also that failure of negotiation would likely lead 
to strained US-Israeli relations and, given Sadat's 
objectives and determination, to closer U.S.-Egyptian ties. 
For United States and Egypt the Canp David accord 
was only a little progress in the way for a comprehensive 
settlement in the region but Israeli attitude towards West 
Bank and Gaza Strip was adament. Egypt, on the other hand, 
was making every effort to be closer to United States as she 
offered the bases for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. Thus, 
the main purpose of Israeli foreign policy making at this 
juncture remained to prevent a close U.S. - Egypt relation 
on the one hand, and the prevention of reconciliation 
between Egypt and Arab World on the other. Even after 
signing the peace agreement, Israeli pattern remain the same 
as it was.Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor which 
created resentment in the Arab World. This caused Egypt a 
28. Ezer Weizman, Op. cit. , pp. 115-116, 
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great deal of embarrassment, delayed the possibility of an 
Egyptian rapprochement with other Arab States, and forced it 
to down-play its relations with the United States. This 
Israeli strategy was successful to the extent that United 
States included Israel in its SDI programme and also signed 
29 
many agreements of strategic importance. 
With the end of Cold VJar the importance of Israel 
for United States, as a base in the region has reduced. 
Just after the Kuwait crisis U.S. wanted peace settlements 
between Israel and Arabs. But the tough stand taken by 
Israeli government under Likud rule created frustration for 
the Bush administration. There was every likelyhood that 
U.S. diplomatic and financial free launch for Israel was 
30 
about to end. As Leon T. Hadar said, 'the end of the Cold 
War diminished Israel's role as the United State's 
"strategic asset" in the West Asia'. This raised questions 
about the need to provide Israel with massive U.S. military 
and economic aid, a dev^elopment that was only accentuated by 
growing public demand to cut foreign aid in general. During 
the Cold War U.S. administrations were willing to back down 
29. Shibley Telhami, Op. cit., p. 413. 
30. Leon T. Hadar, "The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and 
the Fall of the Second Israeli Republic", The Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 46, No.4, Autumn, 1992, p. 608. 
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from any serious confrontation with Israeli governments 
over their West Bank policies in order not to weaken 
Israel's role as a regional ally in the superpower rivalry. 
Those inhibitations disappeared with the reduction in 
tensions between Moscow and Washington and the increasing 
support at home for Bush's tough stand against Israel. 
Again, while initially the Persian Gulf War created expec-
tations of the possible revival of Israel's strategic role, 
the U.S. strategy eventually rested on the basis of a 
military alliance with a moderate Arab block. Israel was 
excluded from that structure, and, instead of serving as a 
strategic asset, it became a burden, with Washington 
investing diplomatic and military efforts to prevent it from 
joining the war. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. -
Israeli relationship returned to basics, where Israel was 
treated as a U.S. client state and not a strategic ally, 
and, more vulnerable to U.S. persuation and pressure. As a 
result, at present, there is less willingness on 
Washington's part to perpetuate the status quo in the 
occupied territories and more interest in tying U.S. backing 
for Israel to compromises on its part regarding the future 
of the occupied territories. 
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CHAPTER - II 
ISRAELI DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
Beginning: 
The history of 'Defence Industry' in Israel can be 
traced back to the end of the World War I with some sporadic 
manufacturing of weapons following the Palestinian attack to 
the Jewish community in the region. But it was 1929 riots 
which proved a turning point, when regular arms manufacture 
was started. And in 1933, the military industry was 
officially founded and expanded both in terras of number of 
employees and the scope of its activities. At that time it 
was difficult or even impossible to get vital weapons from 
abroad. The Jewish community in Palestine then had only 
limited means of production at its disposal and were manu-
facturing relatively simple types of weapons and ammunition 
e.g. handgrenades. 
Since its creation as a State. Israel's existence 
and security has been challenged by her Arab neighbours. 
This fear of insecurity justified the establishment of 
defence industry in Israel. Public opinion in Israel also 
render their favour and support and sometime consider 
essential to have military industrial complex for the 
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preservation of the national security. Defence production 
and development is viewed with pride in the ability and 
technological might of the small developing State and the 
Jewish genious dwelling therein. 
The evolution and development of the military 
industrial complex in Israel can thus be explained as 
follows: 
(a) The security and safety of Israeli citizen remains 
undiminished despite her military deployment in the 
territories, attainment of strategic depth and the 
peace treaty with Egypt. 
(b) Israel's constant involvement in wars - especially 
the Yom Kippur War - most of which were imposed upon 
her, called constant rearmament, alertness and post-
war recuperation. It also demanded parallel 
reinforcement and intensification of activities by 
auxiliary bodies, dealing with families of war, 
casualities and disabled veterans. The increase in 
provision of shelters, payments to reserve soldiers, 
health and welfare aid and the like also demands an 
increase in organizational volume. 
(c) Constant military intensification - which began in 
the confrontation states but has extended to other 
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Arab countries as well over the past decade - is 
expressed both in increased procurement (primarily 
from Soviet sources but also from the United States, 
France and other European countries) and man-power 
alike. Considerable rearmament in Israel has some-
what narrowed the gap with the confrontation states 
in defence spending (from a ratio of 1:3.5 in 1966 
to approximately 1:1.6 in recent years) and to a 
lesser extent, in military manpower as well (1:7 
and 1:5 respectively). 
(d) The administered territories demand a continuing 
level of security activities, intelligence work, 
establishment of a military administration etc. 
(e) Intensification of terrorist activity has led to 
ongoing and preventing security measures, the 
establishment of anti-terror units (within the 
border police) and a civil guard as well has 
increased intelligence work. 
(f) Increased foreign military aid, which finances a 
significant part of Israel's security activities, 
allowed for considerable acquisition of military 
supplies and even for aid in the development of a 
security infra-structure. 
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(g) Public support for Israel's security activities, 
which are perceived virtually automatically (at 
least upto the war in Lebanon) as defence of the 
nation itself - particularly when the standard of 
living rises without direct confrontation with 
intensified defence spending - implies a vertical 
absence of political opposition to these complex 
activities. 
(h) The number of civilians dependent upon the military 
system for their livelihoods have risen signi-
ficantly, thanks to expansion of defence manufacture 
and the sharp increase in foreign orders for Israeli 
arns. 
(i) The number of retiring senior officers has 
increased; the success of many of them in reaching 
positions of leadership in politics served as an 
important incentive for other officers to seek key 
positions in the civilian establishment, a process 
which gradually became institutionalized. 
Alex Mintz, "The Military - Industrial Complex: The 
Israeli Case", edited by Moshe Lissak - "Israeli 
Society and its Defence Establishment". The Social 
Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict. 
Frankcass London, 1984, pp. 113-114. 
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During the period of the war of independence, 
military research and development started. The science corps 
was established and functioned until 1952 within the frame-
work of the IDF and the research and planning division was 
established within the Ministry of Defence and functioned 
until 1958. In 1953, an aeroplane maintenance plant was 
founded which was followed by the Israel Aircraft 
Industries. During this period the expansion was started by 
small arms manufacture which was based on the local know-
how as well as knowledge from abroad. Latter on, however, 
a 'Coordinated National Armament Development Authority' was 
established in Israel. 
Components of Israel's Military-Industrial Complex: 
The Israeli military industrial sector is based on a 
mixed ownership model comprising government-owned corpora-
tions, e.g. Histadurt (The general federation of labour), 
Hevrat Haovdim-owned companies as well as private concerns 
(there are apparently more than 100 private owned companies 
in Israel engaged primarily in military production). The 
representatives of these sectors participate in a high level 
national security policy-making process. In the light of 
the following considerations, the components of the complex 
share responsibility for various spheres of activity in 
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ensuring Israel's basic and ongoing security formulation 
thus can be summarised as follows: 
1. Israel is involved in an extended, exhausting 
and - at least in the near future - unresolvable 
military conflict. 
2. Israel's security is critically endangered in such a 
confrontation because of her inferior position interns of 
manpower and arms relative to that of the Arab 
states. 
3. Israel may relay on no one but herself in matters of 
•^  2 security. 
These perceptions compel the various branches of IDF 
for reinforcement and prepare itself for any possible 
challenge from the hostile Arab nations. This objective is 
manifested through preference for constant increase in 
defence spending, military manpower, military orocurement 
(including both military imports and local procurement), 
arms production, intelligence activities, preventive 
measures against Arab terror, etc. as well as for granting 
the security system autonomy in military policy-:naking and 
priority over any other complex or any other public policy. 
2. Ibid., p. 107. 
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The core components of the Israeli military - Indus-
trial complex are: 
1. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) 
2. The intelligence branches (such as the Mossad) 
3. The Ministry of Defence 
4. The defence industries (both government owned 
industries and non-governmental enterprises) 
5. Political representatives. 
Most military development and manufacturing in 
Israel is carried out in units subject to the direct or 
indirect control of the Ministry of Defence (Israel Aircraft 
Industries, TAAS and RAFAEL) and in the IDF Ordinance corps, 
the activities of which are as: 
The Aircraft Industries: 
Israel's largest manufacturing enterprise, has more 
than 20,000 employees and a sale turnover (1980/81) of some 
is 4.2 billion, including US $ 400 million in exports. The 
company founded in 1953 and became a government-ov/ned 
corporation in 1968, and autonomously controlled by the 
Ministry of Defence, currently has five separate divisions 
and fifteen subsidiaries plants. Among its best known 
products are the Kfir fighter plane, Gabriel sea to sea 
missiles, Dabur and Dvora missile boats, pilotless 
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reconnaissance planes, the Westwind 1124 executive Jet and 
the Arava transport. 
It is uniqueness of some planes, like Arava and 
Westwind, made by lAI that they can be used both for civil 
and military purposes. For example, the Arava 202 version 
in addition to range performance and fuel efficiency, is 
designed to perform a variety of missions including: 
parachuting assault transport, casuality evacuation, cargo 
paradrop, and motor conveyance as well as passanger 
transport. So is the Seascan maritime patrol plane derived 
from the Westwind executive Jet. An all-weather, long-range 
aircraft, the modified Westwind is developed by the IDF and 
the armed forces of several other countries for marine 
reconnaissance, signal intelligence, antisubmarine warfare 
or even, depending upon its configuration, as an air-to-sea 
3 
missile platform. 
lAI also preduced the indigenously designed first 
Kfir planes in 1975. Success in undertaking local manu-
facture of so sophisticated a plane as the Kfir, together 
with its performance in actual warfare, stimulated the 
interest of prospective customers abroad. The Kfir plane 
was again modified as Kfir C-2, the Kfir C-7, praised by 
3. 'Israel', Government Yearbook, 1982/3, p. 134, 
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experts for accuracy and versatility in ground attack as 
well as aerial conbat. 
lAI did not confine only to the aviation production 
but it also entered into other areas, predominantly naval 
warfare and missile development. The most popular export 
item manufactured by lAI is the Gabriel MKIII, a third 
generation of the combat-proven Gabriel missile family. 
As reflected by the Israeli Navy's operational experience in 
« 
1973, the Gabriel is a radar guided missle which can be 
launched from aircraft or ship to skim at low level across 
bodies of water at an effective range of 36 kilometers. An 
other advanced sea-skimming supersonic missle system sold by 
the lAI is the Barak, used as a defence for ships against 
aircraft and missiles. Other naval needs met by lAI 
designers are filled by the Dvora 71 combat boat which is 
described as a fast missile craft capable of serving as a 
long-range patrol boat or for harbor police and custome 
duties, armed escort and in-shore assault. In this same 
category are earlier models, the Dabur and Shapirit fast 
patrol boats, also manufactured by the lAI, in active 
service with the Israeli navy and reported to be operational 
in several foreign navies. It is also producing antimissile 
missile and a helicopter pad capable of being assembled on 
•The Israel Year Book', 1982, "The Israeli Missies 
First Report", pp. 264-269. 
37 
small ships of 400 tons or more. Today, lAI's main 
project is the Lavie fighter plane costing $11 million each, 
that will subsequently replace the present complement of 
Skyhawks and Kfirs. 
The Military Industry (Ta'as): 
The pioneer defence industry in Israel (founded in 
1933) employs about 14,500 persons in 31 plants and units 
manufacturing weapons systems and primarily ammunition 
(of which Ta'as is the IDF's principal supplier), sales 
turnover in 1980/81 exceeded $500 million, including $300 
million in exports. Among the best-known Ta'as developed 
products are the Uzi sub-machine gun, the Galil assault 
rifle, Hetz tank ammunition and path clearing bombs. 
Battle - proven in environments ranging from snow to 
desert, the Uzi sub-machine gun appeals to foreign armies 
because it is relatively inexpensive, lightweight, and can 
be fired full or semi-automatic from the hip or shoulder, 
and therefore, is equally adoptable by security police as 
well. Since 1973 the Uzi has been joined by another IMI 
product, the Galil 5.56 mm and the Galil 7.62 mm assault rifle, 
in service throughout the world. Galil in its different 
version, automatic or semi-automatic, comparable in firing 
5. Bain Galim, an "Israel Navy Publication", No.136 
March, 1984 , p. 36. 
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with NATO ammunition (including the short-barreled SAR 
model) can be used by any kind of military force, infantry, 
airborne, amphibious or armored troops. 
Rocketry is another area of specialization by IMI 
weapons developers. Items sold abroad include Arrowhead 
Chetz tank shells, artillery shells, bomb carriers, grenades 
and rocket propellants used in the Gabriel and Shafrir. The 
two latest items of IMI are a multiple rocket launcher which 
reduces reloading time from forty-six minutes to only five 
minutes and an armor-piercing warhead adoptable to the TOW 
antitank missle capable of penetrating the Soviet T-72 tank. 
The Armament Development Authority (RAFAEL): 
Israel's largest research and development insti-
tution, with more than 5000 employees, was founded in 1958 to 
replace the IDF Science Corps and its successor, the 
Division of Research and Planning. RAFAEL'S major devel-
opments include the Shafir 1, Shafir 2 and Python 3 aii^ to-
air missiles, a computer for firing control of artillery and 
other products. 
Within the IDF itself, renovation and development of 
weapons systems is undertaken by the Ordanance Corps, while 
Tank Administration developed and manufactured the Merkava 
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(chariot) Tank in a project which employed 4000 persons and 
required an investment of approximately $ 199 million. 
Ramta Structures and System: 
This is an lAI subsidiary of Beersheba. It manu-
factures the light armoured reconnaissance vehicles the 
RAMV-1 and RBY MKl and a 20 mm twin-barreled anti-aircraft 
gun. It also designed and built the world's smallest 
missile craft, the Dvora class which is mainly for export. 
Haifa Shipyards: 
Haifa developed the German designed French - built 
SAAR fast attack craft and in 19 February 1973 launched the 
Reshef, first of a new 450 ton SAAR-4 class. On 11 July 
1980 the Alia, first of a new 488 ton SAAR-5 class boat was 
launched. This was capable of carrying anti-submarine 
helicopter. Haifa builds tanks and general purpose landing 
crafts. 
Defence Industry in Private Sectors: 
After the June 1967 war due to over burden on the 
state defence industries local civilian industries were 
6. Alex Mintz Op. cit. , pp. 115-116. See also Israel 
Government Year Book 1981/82: and Israel Tal, "The 
Merkava Project", Ma'arachat, May 1981 , pp. 38-40. 
7. Saad Eshazly, "The Arab Military Option", American 
Middle East Research, San Francisco, 1986, p. 38. 
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included in military manufacturing for example, about 60 
per cent of the Merkava project's production volume was 
carried out in the civilian sector; Production took place 
at 30 main plants, with subcontracting work undertaken by 
approximately 200 civilian firms. Civilian concerns 
invested about $35 million in development of the production 
infrastructure. 
Some non-governmental sectors either directly or as 
sub-contractors are engaged in defence manufacture for the 
Ministry of Defence. Some important industries among them 
are: Soltam, which manufacture primarily 155 mm ammunition, 
light and heavy mortars and their ammunition, Tadiran, the 
IDF's main supplier of communications equipment and Elbit, 
9 
Israel's largest manufacture of computers. 
The civilian economy aided lAI considerably in the 
development of the Kfir fighter plane, with some 160 
civilian plants working as subcontractors. TAAS employs 
about 500 civilian manufacturers, while RAFAEL's manufac-
turing policy is to subcontract as much work as possible to 
civilian plants. During 1978-79 about half of RAFAEL's 
production budget was allocated for procurement of weapons 
8. Alex Mintz, Op. cit. , p. 116. 
9. Ibid. , p. 116. See also The DMS Report, Greenwhich, 
ct: DMS, Inc. 1981 . 
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subsystems from the other defence industries and from about 
150 civilian plants, primarily those engaged in metalwork, 
mechanics, electronics and industrial chemistry. 
Israeli arms production attained vast expansion 
during 1967-73 wars. Arms production expanded sixfold for 
TAAS and more than two fold for the lAI, with increase in 
personnel of 200 per cent and 350 per cent respectively. 
RAFAEL boosted its manpower complement by 250 per cent 
during the same period. Just after the 1967 war, Israeli 
government encouraged theeivilian population for the production 
of arms. The foundation was laid for the manufacture of the 
Israeli fighter plane and for Markava tank and since then 
RAFAEL developed approximately 100 new products for the 
IDF.^^ 
Though the main reason for the expansion of the 
Israeli arms industry is due to its constant involvement in 
war with her neighbours, but French arms embargo in 1967 to 
the West Asia including Israel necessitated Israel for local 
development and production of arras. France had been 
Israel's chief source of arms during the 1950s and 1960s, 
having supplied the Mirag 3, Mystere, Super Mystere, Vatour 
and Oregan planes, Super Frelon helicopters, AMX tanks and 
10. Evron, "The Israel Defence Industry", p. 355 
11. Alex Mintz, Op. cit. , p. 117. 
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other military systems. As General Israel Tal (Markava Tank 
Project Head) points out the main reasons for the develop-
ment and production of the Markava as follows: 
"Various nations have always refused to 
sell new and modern tanks to Israel. 
With the exception of the M-60 tanks, 
sold to us by the United States in 1971, 
no new tank have ever been sold to 
Israel directly from the manufacturer. 
This situation compelled the IDF to face 
the problem of improving and refitting 
old tanks. It thus emerged that the 
curse of refusal to sell us new tanks 
bore a blessing in its wake: We were 
forced to set up an infrastructure for 
renovation and adaptation of tanks and 
to raise generations of ordnance men 
who are experts in tank technology." 12 
Moreover, cancellation of Chieftain tanks by Britain 
also compelled Israel for the local production of tanks. 
Similarly, the delay in supply of F-16 fighter planes and 
postponement of the Memorandum of Strategic Understanding 
between the USA and Israel and delay in shipment of cluster 
bombs in the wake of Operation peace for Galilee by United 
States also necessitated for the local production of arms 
and ammunition in Israel. Thus Israeli desire to act 
freely in international community without any pressure put 
by the arms providing countries like political dependence, 
growing foreign debt, policies of banning, delaying or 
12. Ibid., p. 118. 
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altering the timing of arms shipments also compelled Israel 
for the local production of arms. 
Other factors which led to the rapid development of 
the defence industries in Israel are: 
Constant maintenance of confiscated Russian type 
weapons, particularly those for which ammunition and 
spare parts could not generally be obtained, forced 
Israel's defence industries to overhaul, manufacture 
and specially to provide ammunition for such 
weapons (including ammunition for heavy artillery, 
T-54, and T-55 tanks etc.) 
Transition from primary use of French arms to 
American weapons systems demanded organisational and 
developmental changes including new production 
lines. 
The constant demand for renovation and improvi-
sation of weapons systems to meet specific Israeli 
security needs led to creation of an organisational 
and professional manpower infrastructure. 
Involvement in a regional arms production race led 
to Israeli endeavors in parallel fields (for 
example, the attempt to manufacture a rocket engine 
A4 
in Israel, in the wake of news of an Egyptian 
attempt to construct missiles with German assistance) 
An undertaking by foreign companies to purchase 
Israeli military products in partial fulfilment of 
acquisition agreements has ensured a market 
(although so far of limited dimensions) for Israeli 
13 products. 
IsraeliArms Exports: 
Since 1970's, Israel emerged as major arms supplier 
to the Third Warld countries of Asia, Africa, Central and 
Latin America. For example, Israel provided military 
assistance to Argentina, Chile, the Phillipines, Tiwan, 
South Africa, Iran, El-Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti. 
Defence exports accounts for 25 per cent of total industrial 
export and make-up roughly 60 per cent of all exports of 
machinery, electrical equipments and thereby earning over 
$ 1 billion a year. In 1967, for example, a mere 6 per cent 
of Israel's industrial exports, excluding dimonds, were 
defence related products, and the total value of these 
exports was only $14 million. In 1974, the same products 
accounted for 17 per cent of the manufactured goods sold 
abroad and earned the century about $170 million. By 1978 
13. Ibid. , pp. 118-119. 
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defence exports had risen to 25 per cent of total industrial 
exports and were bringing in revenues of $ 550 million. 
Though after the fall of Shah of Iran, Israeli arms export 
declined in percentage terms but nevertheless, the absolute 
dollar value of military exports continued to rise and their 
share of total industrial exports eventually rebounded as 
well.l^ 
The answer to the question that how and why Israeli 
defence industry is able to export arms to other countries 
are due to its low price and high standards. Its weapons 
are battle tested and their effectiveness has been demons-
trated. There are two main factors for the efficient and 
low price of Israeli weapons. First, Israeli workers are 
well educated and well trained, even by the standards that 
prevails in industrialized countries and this contributes 
significantly to the country's ability to produce a high-
quality product that will compete respectably in the inter-
national market place. It also helps to make possible 
Israel's extensive programme of research and development, 
which, along with high production standards and good quality 
control, give military equipment and weapons a high added 
value. Secondly, after June 1967 war in which Israel was 
14. Mark Tessler, "Israel, Arms Exports and Iran: Some 
Aspects of Israeli Strategic Thinking", Arab Studies 
Quarterly. Vol. 11, No.l Winter 1989, p.103. 
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able to capture West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and Golan Heights, 
it found a ready source of comparatively low-cost workers. 
As pointed out by Blumental, "The flow of unskilled manpower 
from the West Bank and Gaza into the Israeli labour market 
made possible the release of Jewish labour that had been 
employee since the early years of the state in branches of 
industry with low capital reserves per employee, so that it 
couold join the work force of the country sophisticated 
industries. Hence, a new direction opened up for investment 
in the defence industry that involved putting to full 
advantage the relative superiority of the Israeli worker, 
whose education, skill and quality of vork are among the 
highest in the world." 
Despite Israeli government, individuals and interest 
groups too are responsible for arras export because these 
groups have been immensely benefitted over the years, as in 
the case of Iran contra arms deal. The export of arms has 
become essential for the country's economic well-being and 
this has led to a deep concern for the preservation of 
existing markets and the development of new ones. Generally, 
Israeli arms have been exported to those countries who are 
usually faced with security challanges, either domestic or 
15. Ibid., p. 109. 
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foreign. Like Israel, these countries are often isolated 
diplomatically and under international criticism, which 
prevented them to purchase arms from other countries. For 
example, countries like South Africa, Iran, and various 
governments in Africa and South and Central America have 
been the major recipient of Israeli arms. Shahak explains 
this point that "Israel will sell weapons to anybody who 
will buy them, and find the 'reasons' afterwards". Shahak 
further notes in this connection that "Paraguay, the main 
refuge for Nazi criminals and the oldest Nazi - like dic-
tatorship in the world, has bought most of its weapons from 
Israel, and has the best relations with it and that the 
list of special Israeli friends over the last 20 years 
includes Idi Amin, Emperor Bokassa, the various dictators of 
Guatemala, the murderous military Junta of Argentina, 
president Marcos and many others with similar qualities." 
Though this policy of Israel has been criticised 
within Israel but some writers defended by saying that 
Israel is bound to sell its arras to limited and Third World 
Countries because Western Europe is controlled by NATO and 
with East Europe it did not have diplomatic relations. It 
is appropriate to know, that since U.S laws prohibits to 
transfer any U.S. weapons to third party countries directly 
16. Ibid., p. 111. See also Shahak, "Why Israel 
Supported Khomeini", p. 15. 
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or even indirectly via the incorporation of U.S. military 
technology without U.S. prior permission, Israeli arms 
transfer to third countries receives every encouragement 
from the U.S.A. - whether overtly or more subtly through an 
official policy of silence - for its sales which have the 
practical effect of countering any U.S. efforts to signal 
disapproval of government violating human rights. For 
example, the Kfir fighter plane which is an up-graded 
version of the French "Mirage III" which is made with an 
engine imported from the U.S. have been sold to the third 
countries. 
In 1971 Israeli arms industry was producing ammuni-
tion for small arras. But slowly in the preceding years, 
Israel emerged as the major arms manufacturer and exporter. 
And by 1980 it had become the single largest exporter of 
arms to the countries in sub-Sahara, Africa and Latin 
America. In terms of international arms trade Israel ranked 
as the seventh largest exporter in 1980 and is estimated by 
the CIA to now rank as fifth. This accomplishment testifies 
to the extraordinary mobilization of the Israeli economy. 
Though Israeli arras export has not reached to the extent as 
of U.S.A., France and Brit ain but nonetheless is not 
inferior in terms of technology. It is notable that due 
17. Eric Hoogllund, "Israeli Arms Sale in Latin 
America". Strategic Studies Journal, Vol.3, No.l&2, 
1990, p . m . 
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to Arab-Israel conflict on the question of Palestine, most 
of the countries of Asia and Africa restrain themself to 
purchase arms from Israel but even then she enabled itself 
to be one of the leading international arms exporter having 
limited option particularly to the countries of Latin 
America. 
The encouragement of Israeli arras sale also have 
been due to vaccurae created by the United States which due 
to its internal criticism and pressure has rot been able to sell 
arms to such countries whose human rights records are not 
good. Though Israeli government too have been criticised for 
this act but she did not miss the opportunity and exported 
arms to such countries which have been previously purchasing 
arms from United States. 
In 1970's most of the countries of Central and South 
America which fell in the hands of military regimes, have 
been major recepient of Israeli arras. Countries under 
dictatorship like - Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El-Salvacor, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and even Sonoza regime in 
Nicaragua upto mid 1979 have been the major recepient of 
Israeli Arms. Till Somoza regime was in power, Israel was 
supplying 98 per cent of the Nicaragua's total military 
imports. 
18. Ibid., p. 113. 
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Israel has been able to export most of its defence 
products to Latin America because most of the Latin American 
countries maintain diplomatic and trade relations with 
Israel. Total trade with Americas (excluding the United 
States) stood at $ 290.4 million in 1980 and at $ 316 
million in 1981, of which Israeli exports amounted to $ 
161.3 million and $ 157.5 million in each of the respective 
1 9 years. Again Israel has been a major arms supplier to 
Central and South American countries since the 1950s. These 
countries provide an open market to Israel than any other 
region. 
Central America: 
Israel has a historic friendship with Central 
American countries particularly Nicaragua, Costa Rica and 
Dominican Republic which supported the U.N. General Asse:nbly 
resolution in favour of Jewish statehood in 1947. Israel's 
full fledged involvement came into being in the late 1970's 
when United States vacated the markets and Israel became the 
largest supplier of the infantry equipment to El-Salvador 
and Guatemala. Israel also exported the arms and Arava 
transport aircraft to Costa Rica and Honduras, which they 
used for counter insurgency action against guerrilla forces 
19. Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Trade 
Statistics Quarterly 32, October-December 1981 . 
p. 19. 
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in densely forested areas. Israel also assisted Costa Rica 
and Guatemala in intelligence activities and provided 
training to the Government forces of Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras and El-Salvador to combat anti-government 
20 insurgency. Though most of the Honduras military needs 
are filled by the United States but it also has concluded 
arms deals with Israel due to the inability of the United 
States to contain revolutionary forces backed by Nicaragua 
and Cuba. 
El-Salvador is the largest consumer of Israeli arms 
and aid in Central America i.e. 6 per cent of Israel's 
military exports, 80 per cent of El-Salavador's defence 
21 imports. This military relationship again strengthened 
due to the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty by the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979 which upset the regional 
balance and threaten the regimes of countries like 
El-Salvador in immediate or close proximity to Nicaragua. 
This new threat to the other countries of the area provided 
Israel a new opportunity for arms sale. 
Despite these countries, there have been some other 
countries in Central America which have been getting small-
scale arms supply from Israel like the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico and Panama. 
20. Maariv, 17 December 1982. 
21. SIPRI, 1980, p. 86; SIPRI, 1982, pp.213,400. 
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Israeli Arms Deliveries to Central America, 1970-83: 
Costa Rice National Guard Training. 
Small Arms. 
Dominican Uzi Submachine guns 
Republic 
El-Salvador 11-25 Arava (STOL) transports 
24 Fouga Magister trainers and Ouregan 
fighters. 
80 mm rocket launchers 
Uzi submachine guns 
Ammunition, spare parts (including 
captured stores) 
Guatemala 10-17 Arava (STOL) transports 
Armored cars 
10,000 Galil assault rifles 
5 Mobile field Kitchens 
Intelligence and Training 
Helmets and Infantry Equipment 
Kfir fighter planes 
Haiti Light arms and ammunition 
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Honduras 12 Kfir fighter planes 
Uzi and Galil guns 
6 Arava (STOL) transports 
Westwind reconnaissance plane 
5 Coastal petrol boats 
16 Super Mystere planes 
14 Armored cars Mortars 
Mexico 10 Arava (STOL) transports 
Armored cars and troops carriers 
Nicaragua 2 Arava (STOL) transports 
Rifles, ammunition 
Patrol boats 
Radio equipment 
T-54 and T-55 tanks 
Panama Radar and communication system 
1 Westwind reconnaissance plane 
Derived from SIPRI year book 1980, 1982, IISS. 
the Military Balance, 1979-80 through 1983-84; 
Jane's; International Defence Review; Defence 
and Foreign Affairs: The New York Tinies; 
Washington Post: Cynthia Arnson "Israel and 
Central Aierica". New outlook, Vol. 27, No.3-4 
March/April (1934), pp. 19-22; Khadashot, 
8 June 1934, pp. 56-57. 
54 
South America: 
Israel justified its arms sale to South American 
countries for it is serving the larger American goal of 
containing communist subversion in the Southern hemisphere. 
Israel also wanted to fill the gap created by U.S. cut in 
arms supply to Latin American countries in the late 1970's 
22 from 70 to 20 per cent. 
Argentina is the largest customer of Israeli arms 
in South America since 1970's. In fact Argentina ranks 
second only to South Africa as a major customer for all 
Israeli arms exports. Brazil, which is also among the leading 
arms supplier to the Third World countries, is purchasing 
arms from Israel. In 1982 it purchased eight helicopters 
and in 1984 Brazilian naval command announced its intention 
to purchase Gabriel missiles from Israel. Ecuador is also 
purchasing Barak missiles for its navy from Israel. Again, 
Israel's relation with Chile have been very cordial as it is 
the single largest arms exporting country to Chile. Israel 
not only supply all types of weapons to Chile but it also 
manufactures uniforms and helmets for the Chilean armed 
forces. It is also believed that since 1978 Israel has 
military advisors, particularly experts in countering 
terrorist activities, stationed in Chile. 
Richard Betts, "The Tragicomedy of Arms Trade 
Control", International Security 5, Summer 1980 , 
p. 100. 
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IsraellArms Deliveries to South America, 1970-1983: 
Argentina Gabriel missiles 
Military uniforms and gear 
48 Nesher (Dagger, or Mirage III 
Combat Aircraft 
Shafrir Missiles 
4 Coastal patrol boats 
30 Skyhawks jet fighters 
Five,; control systems 
Parachutes 
Mobile field hospitals 
Bolivia 6 Arava (STOL) transports 
24 Kfir fighter planes 
Brazil Helicopters 
Gabriel missiles 
Chile 6 Reshef class fast patrol boats 
Shafrir air-to-air missiles 
Radar Systems 
Light arms and ammunition 
Mobile field hospitals 
Fire Control Systems 
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Colombia 3 Arava (STOL) transports 
12 Kfir fighter planes 
Gabriel missiles 
Field artillery pieces 
Tanks 
Airplane maintenance equipment 
Ecuador Barak anti-missile missiles 
Rockets, explosive, ammunition 
12-24 Kfir fighter planes 
Field Kitchens 
Armored personnel carriers 
9-10 Arava (STOL) transports. 
Paraguay 6 Arava (STOL) transports. 
Peru Small arms and amnunition 
Radio equipment 
Venezuela 24 Kfir fighter planes 
3 Arava (STOL) transports. 
Rubber boats 
Multiple rocket launchers 
Tactical communications equipment 
Derived from SIPRI year books: Ills, Defence 
and Foreign Affairs; Khadashot, 8 June,1984, 
Steinberg, in Ball and Leitenberg, p. 296. 
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Africa: 
Africa has been an important region for Israel 
since 1960's. Though Africa has been the least armed 
importing region of the world but in 1971-1980 continent of 
Africa registered the largest average annual rate of 
increase (33.37 per cent) in arms imports as compared to 
23 
other regions. Post-colonial insecuritries unresolved 
boundary disputes, and ethnic irredentism are some of the 
causes for the current trend toward increased military 
expenditures by each of the African nations. 
South Africa is the largest customer of Israeli 
arras. It has been purchasing 35 per cent of all Israeli 
arras sold in the year 1970-1979. Despite South Africa, 
there have been some other Central African Republics like 
Ethiopia, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zaire and Zambia which have been purchasing arras 
from Israel at one time or another. Gabon, Chad and Liberia 
could also be added to the list. The Librarian interest in 
Israeli arms could be seen during the president Samuel 
Does's visit to Israel when he toured several Israeli 
military plants and array facilities in August, 1983. In 
23. ACDA, 1983, p. 29. A regional analysis, Bruce E. 
Arlinghaus, (ed.), "Arms for Africa: Military 
Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing 
World", Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1983 . 
24. SIPRI, 1980, p. 86. 
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September 1983, Liberia contracted for 4 Arava transport 
planes amounted $ 10 million. 
Israel have military relationship even with 
countries like Morocco and Ethiopia. Israel's military 
relation with Morocco was due to the reason that Morocco 
happens to be a moderate Arab and pro-Western monarchy and 
was under the direct threat from Nasserist Egypt, Algeria, 
Libya or Polisario movement. Israel also wants the smooth 
emigration of Jews from Morocco and has maintained for many 
years a stable relation with its regime. 
Israel also provided military assistance to Ethiopia 
during the last days of Emperor Haile Selassie. This policy 
was continued even after Ethiopia broke relationship with 
Israel during 1973 war. Israel provided weapons and 
advisors to Addis Ababa in its struggles against Eritrea 
and in the Ogaden war with Somalia. In 1977 Israel provided 
bombs and ammunition and its mechanics kept U.S. made F-5 
fighter planes in service, enabling the Ethiopian airforce 
25 to combat Somalia's advantage in armor. Similarly, Israel 
provided arms and even technical advisers in Chad to the 
constituted government in N'djamena to contain Libyan domi-
nation in North Africa. 
25. Robert F. Gorman, "Political Conflict on the Horn of 
Africa", New York: Praeger, 1981 , pp. 121, 137-138 
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Israeli Arms Deliveries to Africa,1970-1983: 
Clskei 1 Westwind reconnaissance plane 
Ethiopia Light weapons, mortars, ammunition 
Ghana Uniforms 
Fire-Fighting equipment 
Kenya 2 Missile boats 
Sea-to-Sea Gabriel missiles 
Uniforms and military gear 
Mobile field Kitchens and hospitals 
Airplane maintenance equipment 
Liberia 4 Arava (STOL) transports 
Morocco Armored personnel carriers 
AMX tanks 
Nigeria Oil tanker trucks 
Fire fighting trucks 
Uniforms, infantry equipment 
Field Kitchens and hospitals 
Swaziland 1 Arava (STOL) transports 
Tanzania Field Kitchens and hospitals 
Uganda 10 Sherman tanks 
Zaire Galil, Uzi, M-16, Kalachnikov rifles 
Tents and sleeping bags 
Rifle and artillery shells 
T-54 tanks 
Zimbabwe 11-15 Bell helicopters 
o M 1 n o / 
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Asia: 
Israel entered into Asian market since the fifties 
when it sold two frigates to Ceylone, on a country - by -
country basis. Countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand 
have also been the trading partners and the recipients of 
military aid from Israel. 
The major Israeli achievement in this direction is 
its access to the countries of Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN): The Philippines, Singapore,Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand. The interest of the ASIAN countries 
in the high technology and rapid economic development 
provided good opportunity for Israel to enter the South East 
Asian market. 
Despite these efforts, many Israeli companies also 
wanted to enter in Far Eastern markets. Tadiran, for 
example, is one of them. Out of its five export categories, 
three of them are directly related to security field and 
constituted 70 to 80 per cent of the company's total 
exports. Despite its setback in 1982, Tadiran make all its 
effort for good performance in Far Eastern market in 1983 
and its export reached nearly $60 million or nearly 30 per 
7 ft 
cent of all its foreign Sales. Thus, Israel wants to avail 
all the possible opportunities in the region and to enhance 
her trade, military and technical cooperation with Far 
Eastern countries and to strengthen her position among the 
countries of the region. 
26. Haaretz, 17 January, 1983. 
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Israeli Arms Deliveries to Asia 1970-1983 
Australia 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
18 
New Zealand 
Papua-New Guinea 3 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Airplane parts 
Computer and communication systems 
Skyhawk planes 
Gabriel missiles 
Skyhawk planes 
Mirage Jet fighters 
Military communications equipment 
Parachutes 
Rubber boats 
Arava planes 
Military gear 
Mobile field Kitchens and hospitals 
Serveillance and radio equipment 
155 mm Howitzers 
AMX light tanks 
Gabriel missies 
Troop carriers 
Military and infantry gear 
Gabriel missiles 
Shafrir missiles 
Gabriel missiles 
Armored vehicles 
Arava (STOL) planes 
From Jerusalem Post, 3 May 1984, and Inter-
national edition of JP, week ending 16 
February 1985. 
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Relation with Iran: 
Till the reign of Shah of Iran, the annual Israeli 
military supplies to this country reached $.5 billion. 
Israel also gave training to the Iranian military generals 
and assisted its security police (SAVAK). It is also 
notable that United States encouraged Israeli-Iranian 
relationship because both the countries were U.S. alies in 
27 the West Asia during the reign of Shah. 
Israel not only assisted Iran in military field but 
also helped in the developmental programmes like agriculture 
and the management of water resources. In fact Shah 
considered Israel as a model which had developed within a 
short time. Israel has also been selling arms to Iran since 
the early days of Ayatullah Khomeini regime and this was 
confirmed by Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon in 1982. 
It is also believed that Israel received U.S. approval for 
arms sale to Iran. In the year 1985 Israeli Defence 
Ministry approved the sale to Iran of $ 50 million worth of 
28 Israeli - made mortar shells and other weapons. Despite 
of economic consideration, Israel sold arms to Iran in 
order to signal to customers elswhere that it is a reliable 
supplier which does not make political judgements about the 
regimes to which it sells. 
27. Mark Tessler, Op. clt. , pp. 112-113. 
28. Ibid., p. 114. 
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The other thing which compelled Israel to maintain 
cordial relation with Iran was oil. Due to its enmity with 
Arab countries, the only alternate left to Israel was Iran 
for oil supply during the regime of Shah. Again, Israeli 
relations with Iran were based on the motive to break out of 
the encirclement of its Arab adversaries. According to 
Gideon Rafael, a senior Israeli diplomat: "When Israel's 
policy - makers realized that attempts at breaking the wall 
of Arab hostility were doomed to failure, they turned their 
sights elswhere. Beyond the wall there were important 
countries in the Middle East and Africa which were 
accessible to Israel. The two most important of them, Iran 
and Turkey, though predominently Moslem were guided in the 
conduct of their foreign policy by political rather than 
29 
religious considerations". 
The establishment of ties to Islamic countries 
constituted a symbolic as well as a practical blow against 
the Arab efforts to isolate Israel. Israel's cordial 
relation with Iran was also due to a large number of Jews 
living in Iran and Iran's utility for forestalling the 
advance of Soviet power and to check the spread of communisr:i 
in the West Asia with United States and Britain. 
29. Ibid., p. 115. 
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Israeli arms sale to the Islamic Republic was due to 
political and strategic considerations and to find a market. 
Israel did not want a total Iraqi victory over Iran because 
it will solidify Iraqi position of leadership and to reduce 
the political influence of mere moderate and pro-western 
government in such countries as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan 
and Morocco. As expressed by an Israeli scholar Menashe 
Amir on Iran, "an outright Iraqi victory (during the early 
stages of the war) would have put Saddam Hussain at the 
head of a triumphant, expansionist, pan-Arab regime, which 
30 
would have been direct military threat to Israel". Again, 
Iraqi loss in the war would lead to an Arab preoccupation 
with the growing challenge from Iran and from radical 
Islam, and this would divert attention fron the conflict 
with Israel. This attitude of Israel compelled it to supply 
arms to Iran despite its anti-Zionist policy. 
Israelis also believe that fundamentalist government 
in Iran is temporary and soon a moderate government will 
come to power, and thus Israel would be able to maintain its 
long standing contacts with Iranian military and business 
circles. As stated by one Israeli scholar: "Most Israeli 
experts and politicians see Iran as a "natural ally". They 
argue that it is a non-Arab country with strategic 
30. Ibid., p. 119, 
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interests very much like those of Israel. They also argue 
that the fundamentalist movement will eventually pass and 
that the Iranians will then "rediscover" these interests. 
As a result we should take care not to cut our ties to 
Iran, especially to its military. Indeed, some of our 
experts think the Iranian army may come to power very soon. 
For these reasons, most of the Israeli military and 
political establishment is "Iran - oriented" and believes 
that Tehran will eventually return to the Western political 
1.31 
camp." 
Israeli perception to help Iran in its war with Iraq 
was that it would help in prolonging the war by encouraging 
Iran to reject a political settlement. This, in turn, would 
add to war weariness and discontent at home and, amidst 
growing casualties and diminishing investment in domestic 
development, the Islamic Revolution would become bogged 
down and discredited. 
The final reason of Israeli relation with Islamic 
Republic is its calculations about the costs and benefits 
for Israel's important relationship with United States as 
it had been in Iran - contra episode and thus enhanced its 
strategic utility to the United States. Israel may have 
fashioned its policy towards the Islamic Republic, at least 
31. Ibid., pp. 120-21. 
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in part, with an eye towards the United States. Some 
scholars believe that Israel wanted to draw the United 
States into an arms deal with Iran in order to undermine 
U.S. complaints about Israel' s own weapons sale to Islamic 
Republic. In this way when U.S.A. itself will sell arms to 
Iran it could not condemn or punish Israel for aiding an 
avowedly anti-American regime. So, the purpose of Israeli 
arms sale to Iran have been to contain challenges from the 
Arab World and to offer the Jewish state an opportunity to 
deliver for its American patrons, to demonstrate to the 
United States that there are tangible and important 
benefits to be gained from its close political alliance with 
32 Israel. At the same time, Israel also wanted recognition 
from U.S.A. for its arms sale and no interference by the 
American arms agents. As said by, Ya'akove, a Minister in 
Begin Ministry, "we shall say to the Americans: Don't 
compete with us in Tiwan, do not compete with us in South 
Africa, don't compete with us in the Carribean area or in 
other areas in which we can sell weapons directly. Let us 
do it, sell the ammunition and the equipment using an 
accredited representative, Israel will be your accredited 
33 
representative". 
32. Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
33. Eric Hoogllund, Op. cit., p. 118 
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Later by signing official 'Memorandur. of Under-
standing on Strategic Co-operation' with United States, on 
November 30, 1981, Israel sought recognition of its role in 
"Third World". As expressed by Hebrew paper, Al-Ha'-ishmar 
on December 29, 1981; Israeli officials claia that one of 
the advantages Israel will gain from the new strategic 
accord with the United States will be greater role in the 
Third World. The leader of pro-western regimes in the 
Third World, especially of those countries that have un-
popular authoritarian regimes and a negative inage in 
Washington, would like to make use of Israel's A:ierican 
Connection according to the same source. They seem to hope 
that Israel will be able to help them through her influence 
and efforts in Washington, to obtain direct U.S. political, 
military and economic aid, and perhaps also an increase in 
34 indirect military assistance. 
Israel's Nuclear Programme: 
Israel has adopted a policy of nuclear deterrence 
for its security. Israel's nuclear research progra-ne had 
started in 1959 and is suspected to have developed sone sort 
of nuclear weapon. The importance of Israeli nuclear 
programme thus has been expressed by a senior General, "that 
unless the country begins to plan now, Israel may not have a 
deterrence capability when the Middle East goes nuclear, 
3A. Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
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and we shall find ourselves in the next war without the 
ability to defend our home front (against nuclear attack) or 
to win the battlefield."-*-^  
The need for the development of nuclear weapons was 
also emphasised by president Katzir in 1974 that, "It has 
been our intention to provide the potential for nuclear 
development. We now have that potential. We will defend 
this country with all possible means at hand. We have to 
develop more powerful and new arms to protect ourselves". 
At the same time the nuclear option of some Arab states also 
aggravated the situation. Iraq, for example, initiated its 
nuclear and chemical programmes in the 1970s. Syria now is 
improving its missile delivery programme. Even non-Arab 
Iran's efforts to upgrade its nuclear related programmes are 
motivated, at least partially, by concerns about nuclear 
37 
capability. Israel has always refused to place its 
nuclear installations under fullscope safeguards and sign 
the N.P.T. Israelis believe that Israel can not afford to 
lose a war and still remain a viable nation and should gain 
nuclear capability. 
35. Geoffrey Aronson, "Hidden Agenda: U.S. Israeli 
Relations and the Nuclear Question", Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 46, No.4, Autumn 1992, p. 625. 
36. Roger F. Pajak, "Nuclear States and the policies of 
the Kiddle East Countries", International Affairs, 
Vol. 59, No.4, Autumn 1983, p. 593. 
37. Geoffrey Aronson, Op. cit. , p. 618 . 
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Nuclear weapons would provide Israel for the first 
time with the ability to threaten unacceptable punishment in 
relation to an Arab challenge to Israel's survival. 
Secondly, the sheer size of the punishment involved would 
nake it nearly certain that the Arabs would correctly asses 
the damage they might suffer should they attempt to 
38 
challenge Israel's survival. 
Israeli nuclear programme is absoluteiydifferent from 
those of U.S.A., France or China. Israel had developed 
nuclear weapons for its need considering her geographical 
location, which is to be used against its neighbours in the 
West Asia. Israel does not need high-yield hydrogen bombs 
which would injure its own population if used against its 
immediate neighbours. It realised in the 1960s that it 
wanted tactical nuclear weaponry. This led to the 
development of nuclear shell fired from the 155 mm howitzer 
or from a naval gun. These shells contain a low-yield, 
two kiloton nuclear device, the ideal nuclear weapons for 
Israel. Israel may now possess 70 nuclear weapons stock-
piled and has also developed 100 short range (400 mile) 
Jericho - II missiles capable of carrying a nuclear 
39 
v;arhead. On the other hand, Israel did not want to see 
38. Shai Feldman, "Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A 
Strategy for the 1980s", Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1982, p. 54. 
39. Shyam Bhatia, "Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East", 
Routledge, New York, 1988, pp. 34-35. 
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that any Arab country could possess a nuclear weapons or 
develop a nuclear reactor because Israel consider it a 
direct threat to its existence. As in July 1981 Israeli 
F-16 fighter - bombers flew 650 miles to bomb the Iraqi 
nuclear plant outside Baghdad which was capable of 
producing a nuclear weapons within the next two decades. 
Since then, there are no Arab states with nuclear programmes 
which are likely to become even a minor threat to Israel. 
This policy of Israel was also confirmed by Ariel Sharon 
that "declared principle in Israel's defence policy for the 
1980's was its determination to prevent confrontationist 
states from access to the nuclear weapon", thus demanding 
a unique position for Israel in the region. The only 
Muslim country, Pakistan, has registered any genuine 
progress in nuclear sphere. Israel fear that Pakistan may 
transfer nuclear weapons to Arab countries which may 
endanger her security and challenge its monopoly in the 
region. Israel has been thinking about to destroy Pakistani 
nuclear facility and has been urging India to help or 
facilitate such an action- New Delhi, however, has refused 
/ 1 
to cooperate with Israel in this matter. 
40. M.V. Leeuwen and B. Soetendrop, 'Israel', H. Muller, 
(ed.), "A European non-prolifration Policy; Pros-
pects and Problems", Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, 
pp. 236-237. 
41. Saudi Gazette (Riyadh), 2 April 1988, p. 6. 
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Israel happens to be the only nuclear state in West 
Asia. So to deter Israel, Arab states developed chemical 
weapons and ballistic missies. Six countries in West Asia 
have chemical weapons arsenals, e.g. Iraq, Egypt, Syria, 
Libya, Iran and Israel. To counter these chemical and 
biological threats Israel has the World's most elaborate 
civil defence programmes. Israel has had a chemical 
weapons capability since the 1970's but it is currently 
believed to be increasing its stockpile of gas weapons. Her 
entire population is provided with gas masks and other 
chemical defensive equipment. Israel also produced air 
and purification systems on armored vehicles, respirator 
masks, protective clothing and personal treatment Kits in 
case of injury. By these preventive measures Israel became 
one of the best prepared country against chemical or 
biological attacks, thereby, reducing the possibility of 
high casualities among their small population. The proli-
feration of nuclear and chemical weapons are creating 
tension in the region. As said by a senior officer of 
Israeli defence force, 'it has changed the rules of war in 
the Middle East'. 
42. Armed Forces, Vol. 1, 7 No.4 April 1988, p. 136. 
See also Armed Forces Journal International, May, 
1990, p. 60. 
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The proliferation of missies in the West Asia is 
causing a serious threat to the security of Israel. In the 
past wars between Israel and Arabs, only Israel had this 
capability but today about ten countries have ballistic 
missiles e.g. Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. The proliferation of 
missiles begins in the region in early 1980's following the 
Iran-Iraq war. 
The main problem created by missile proliferation in 
the region for Israel is that it has undermined Israeli air 
superiority and subejcted pre-emptive strikes. Again the 
capability of missiles to deliver chemical and even nuclear 
weapons are upsetting the military balance in the region 
which has long favoured the Israelis . For example, 
Syrian SS-21 missile is only two minutes away from Israel. 
In the Gulf War, iraq attacked Israel by raissile, namely, 
Al-Hussain and Al-Abbas which is matter of concern for 
Israel. Further in response to the recent missile proli-
feration in the region Israel has expanded its missile 
programme. It has launched Ofek-1 in September 1988 and 
Ofek-2 experimental communications satellites in april 1990. 
43. Frank Barnaby, "Arms Control After the Gulf War, 
Conflict Studies 240", April 1990, Research 
Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 
London, pp. 2-4. 
73 
Israel is also working in cooperation with America (who are 
funding 80 per cent of the cost) over an ambitious $ 200 
million research effort to construct an anti-ballistic 
missile system, the Arrow. Israel has been also testing 
the 1400 km Jericho-II, the medium range ballistic 
mmissile. These Israeli missile development shows its 
intention to maintain its superiority over the Arab states. 
4A. Ron Mattews, "Dangerous New Twists in the Middle 
East's Arms Race Spiral", RUSI Journal, Vol. 135, 
No .4, Winter 1990, p. 35. 
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CHAPTER - III 
THE ISRAELI - U.S. CONNECTION 
The Strategic Importance of Israel 
for the United States: 
Though the U.S. foreign policy towards the West Asia 
is generally guided due to the presence of oil reserves and 
its strategic location etc. but the most important factor 
for US presence in the region is to support and ensure the 
existence of Israel as its close ally. Since the advent of 
Cold VJar till 1968, West Asia had strategic significance for 
United States mainly on four counts: (i) Presence of Israel 
in the region, (ii) presence of petroleun and its inimense 
strategic significance for the US and its western allies, 
(iii) vulnerability of the region to Soviet influence and 
geographic contiguity of countries like Turkey, Iran and 
Afghanistan to Soviet Union, and (iv) strategic signifi-
cance of sea lanes of communications (SLOCS) like Suez 
Canal, Straits of Hormuz and Persian Gulf to counter Soviet 
presence in the Indian Ocean. 
In the beginning, American involvement in the region 
was only confined to trade, missionary education and health. 
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The first major element of American interest in the region 
was introduced by the US Oil Companies during the inter-war 
period. The Second VJorld War brought into focus the 
strategic importance of petroleum and its by-products as 
2 
"foundations of the ability to fight a modern war." 
Further the Soviet presence in the region and her influence 
in countries like Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and Egypt also 
compelled US to play a more dominant role in the region. 
Under the Truman doctrine, containment of Soviet influence 
and the preservation of local conservative regimes also 
prompted United States to actively involve itself in the 
region. 
After the World War II, oil occupied strategic 
significance for the economic security and well-being of 
United States and other Western countries. In 1950 oil 
accounted for about 30 per cent of the combined energy 
requirements of North America, Western Europe and Japan. By 
3 
1973 the figure rose to the tune of about 53 per cent. 
J.C. Hurewitz, "Diplomacy in Near and Middle East". 
A Documentry Record 1914-1956, Vol. II. New York, 
Octagon Books, 1972, p. 238. 
William B. Quandt, "Saudi Arabia in 1980's, Foreign 
Policy, Security and Oil". Washington D.C. The 
Brooking Institution, 1981 , p. 47. 
United States, Project Independence: "US and World 
Energy Outlook through 1990". Washington Cong-
ressional Research Service, 1977 , p. 677t 
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By 1979, 45 per cent of the United States, 55 per cent of 
the EEC's and 70 per cent of Japan's energy consumption was 
through oil. During 1950 United States was world's largest 
producer of petroleum and in 1960 its dependence on oil 
import was 16 per cent which reached to 35 per cent by 1973 
when the first energy crisis surfaced. Subsequent years 
witnessed increased American dependence on oil import. Oil 
being crucial factor in US and Western countries economy and 
West Asian countries being the main source of oil, the 
region was and is undoubtedly of immense strategic signi-
ficance for the United States. Any disruption in the flow 
of oil from the West Asia could severely affect basic US 
economic and strategic interests. The US multinational oil 
companies operating in the region involved capital invest-
ments around $ 3.5 billion in 1974. The replacement value 
of US conipany investments in the Gulf oil industry was 
estimated at some $ 50 billion in 1972 and yearly income 
from these investments was equal to half of the US balance of 
payment deficit at that time. Thus the US had high economic 
stakes in the region. 
4. K.R., 'US Petroleum Imports from the Gulf. Use of 
arned force to ensure supplies, Washington: Cong-
ressional Research Service, 1982 , p.2. 
5. Henry Kissinger, Energy - The Necessity of Decision, 
in Richard P. Sttebins and Elaine P. Adam (eds.), 
"American Foreign Relations 1975: A Documentary 
Record" New York: New York University Press, 1977 , 
p.53. 
6. R.M. Burrell, 'The Persian Gulf. The Washington 
Papers. No.l, Baverley Hills; C.A.: Sage Publica-
tions, 1972, p.9. 
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Another reason which made the West Asian region 
strategicly more important for United States was Soviet 
naval presence in Western Indian Ocean in the wake of 
British withdrawal from the area by the close of 1960s. The 
American perceptions about Soviet manoeuvres become more 
entrenched as the Soviets gained foothold in Iraq, Ethopia 
and South Yemen. 
The importance of West Asia is realized by most of 
the presidents of the United States. President Eisenhower 
described it in 1951 as the world's most strategically 
important area. So said President Nixon after twenty years 
whereas President Reagan gave this region the "first 
priority" in his foreign policy formulation. 
The importance of Israel for the United States 
becomes more vulnerable because without the Israeli support, 
it was not possible for the United States to continue its 
naval presence in the Mediterranean. It was this naval base 
from where US balanced both USSR and Eastern Europe. Further 
the deployment of SLBM, Polaris, poseidon and Trident system 
made the USSR vulnerable to the US attack.^ 
7. Hossein amir Sadeghi (ed.), "The Security of the 
Persian Gulf", Groom Helm Ltd. London U.K., 1981, 
p.l. 
8. J.P. Anand, "Indian Ocean, Strategic Water Ways". 
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, No.4, April-June 1984. 
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By having an edge over fleets in the Mediterranean 
sea United States can reinforce arms particularly aircrafts 
to land and air units fighting from the bases in the West 
Asia. United States can target almost entire West Asia from 
her military bases in Israel. United States even has 
developed some special weapons for Israeli use on the 
condition that the US would be provided with detailed 
information about their combat performance. Western 
countries also gained valuable information as a result of 
9 
Israeli capture of much advanced Soviet weaponry. 
Another reason which led the special relations 
between United States and Israel is the shared democratic 
traditions and values. There was a domestic American 
political consideration - namely, the existence of a strong, 
well organized and politically active pro-Israeli community 
in the United States, spearheaded by Jaws but also including 
many non-Jews. Despite of all the burdens like economic, 
military, cultural and political, large numbers of American 
people in and out of government think that Israel can still 
serve as a useful ally for the United States. As Professor 
Spiegal of UCLA wrote in commentary in June 1983; "The facts 
9. Peter Mangold, "Superpower Intervention in the 
Middle East". Croom Helm, London, Great Britain, 
p.17. 
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speak for themselves. Israel is a unique and impressive 
ally. It influences political development in its own area, 
causes the Soviet embrassment and military difficulties, 
facilities the evolution of American weapons, conveys 
lessons which can be learned only from combat experience, 
provides intelligence on the region and saves U.S. defence 
costs through innovations and modifications of US weaponry. 
Despite claims that Israel is a strain on the US treasury, 
the types of assistance it provides more than compensate for 
US aid".^° 
After the collapse of Iran as a US ally in the West 
Asia, Israel became the single US defence partner in the 
region. A partnership that is most likely to result 
eventually in Israel's playing an increasingly more 
important strategic role for the United States. Being the 
only reliable friend of United States, Israel possess the 
most sophisticated arms in the region. Israeli location 
for United States becomes more important in the sense that 
if Suez Canal is closed, it can provide easy access to Red 
Sea by land, thus can connect Red Sea with that of 
Mediterranean Sea. The ideal strategic bases in Israel can 
10. A Reporter's Note Book, "Between Washington and 
Jerusalem", Wolf Blitzer, New York, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1985, p. 76. 
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be used for direct military intelligence, electronics 
warfare, reconnaissance, logistical support services and 
medical facilities. In addition, they are the most modern 
and advanced bases, stationing weapons found only in the US 
and the NATO armouries. It is Israel which may help USA by 
providing information about the desert warfare and climate 
aspects of the West Asia and about the efficacy of the US 
weapons and their defects. Forty five years of US -
Israeli friendship confirms that both the countries are 
important for each other. 
Besides all these geo-strategic and political 
importance of Israel for the United States there are some 
moral and humanitarian grounds on which Jewish people 
deserve sympathy. Like many other people, Americans also 
extended their sympathy to the Jews for their terrible 
holocaust. On a more palpable and observable plane, the 
United States has had a long tradition of sympathy for 
peoples striving for nationhood and independence generally 
and for persecuted peoples in particular, which inclined it 
to look with favour on the aspirations of Jewish 
nationalism. And while it is true that Jewish nationalism 
conflicted with Palestinian nationalism which might also be 
11. M. Sayeed Ala::;, "Towards the Persian Gulf War", 
Causeway Book Centre, Delhi (India), 1993, p.13. 
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entitled to sympathy on this score, Americans have tended to 
give priority to the Jewish aspirations to national resto-
ration because these aspirations still left room for the 
Palestinians to realize theirs, where as the Palestinians 
aspirations negated Israel's entirely at least until very 
recently. (Which is today realized by P.L.O.). Moreover, 
the Jewish claims received a far wider hearing because of 
the presence of millions of Jews in the United States, and 
encountered for greater receptivity because of their 
12 
association with the Biblical record and prophecies. 
Again, like the United States, Israel is a nation of 
diverse immigrants who left inhospitable lands for new 
shores where they endeavored to build a new just and free 
society, and experimented in the process with new forms of 
human association. Also, the pioneering spirit that built 
Israel is reminiscent of America's youthful days, and its 
drive and accomplishments in the economic, social, scientfic 
and military spheres have been strongly appreciated by an 
America dedicated to the cult of achievement and 
13 progress. 
12. Nadav Safran, "Israel, the Embattled Ally", The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England 1978, p. 572. 
13. Ibid., p. 572. 
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Despite all these factors there is one important 
factor which is serving as a bridge between United States 
and Israel and have their impact on American politics and 
policy, is the Jewish presence in United States. Though 
they are a very small minority but they use their franchies 
more than the average for all Americans. Moreover, American 
Jews have been important financial contributors to election 
campaigns of favourably disposed candidates even in consti-
tuencies that do not have substantial numbers of Jewish 
14 
voters and this have to enhance their political weight. 
It is not only US government which is providing 
financial help to Israel but US Jews also contributing a lot 
to the development of Israel. "There is hardly an important 
educational, cultural, scientific or philanthropic 
institution in Israel today which is not supported in sone 
significant way by American Jewish aid (as well as govern-
mental) aid, including all the institutions of higher 
learning and research, the main museums, the Israel phil-
harmonic orchestra, the Hadassah Medical Centre and other 
facilites, the Histadrut, almost the entire vocational 
school system, and scores of religious schools, orphanages, 
and culture and sports centres throughout the country". "* 
14. Ibid., p. 574. 
15. Ibid., p. 573. 
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Not only this, US Jews also have been trying their best to 
bring scientists, artists, journalists, politicians, sports 
stars etc. to Israel. In recent years, the number of 
American Jewish tourists in Israel have exceeded over 
200,000 annually. They not only spend money that is helpful 
to the Israeli economy but have also brought to the masses 
of Israelis an awareness of the ties between their country 
and the United States. 
Defence Collaboration in Research and Development: 
Transfer of technology can take place through 
various methods. It may be from one country to another 
country, it may be from one man to another man or across the 
field or industry in which the technology occurs. Again 
educational training in high technology is the essence of 
the technology transfer. Formal or informal technical 
exchange that leads to continuing contact is a com-on, 
useful and highly effective means of conveying technical 
understanding. Such training may take place in a variety of 
contexts: 
government-to-government programmes in the host 
country (recipient) or in the providing country. 
govsrnment-to-private industry programmes in either 
country. 
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government-sponsored industry-to-industry programmes, 
government-sponsored industry-to-government pro-
grammmes. 
wholly private programmes. 
The training may take the forms of education, 
technical assistance, consulting, or some other type of 
training. There is a growing role for management services 
and counselling throughout the West Asia. The transfer of 
military technology becomes more important because it 
changes some situations like military capabilities, export, 
the economic profile, regional balance of power and the 
independence of producer fron external pressures. 
The research and development progranme between 
United States and Israel and the technological know-how 
transfer to Israel by United States affects the status-quo 
by various means: 
First, Israel is the major recipient of the -ost 
advanced US military technology. 
Second, this transfer relationship has important 
political repercussions and therefore a presumptive 
impact on the possibility of achieving US policy 
objectives in a critical region of the world. 
16. Kwang-II Back, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon 
(eds.) "The Dilemma of Third World Defence Indus-
tries", Supplier Control or Recipient Autonomy? 
CIS-Inha University Westview Press, 1989, p.62. 
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Third, the Arab-Israeli military balance is consi-
dered important to international peace and security. 
Such transfers are presumably thought at least by 
the recipient to affect that balance. 
Fourth, the salience of Israel and West Asia as a 
whole are such that arms and technology transfers to 
Israel have received substantial coverage by the 
world media. 
Fifth, the nature of Israeli technology demand is 
such that compromise of sensitive technologies might 
be considered a possibility and a significant 
danger, unlike the compromise of less advanced tech-
nologies exported to other Third-World countries. 
Sixth, other developing countries, including major 
US allies like Korea and Turkey have studied the 
Israeli case, so precedents established vis-a-vis 
Israel have frequently been applied elsewhere. 
Seventh, Israel is the leading edge of second-tier 
military exporters. Its leaders have consistently 
pioneered the way in terms of new techniques to 
affect technology transfer on the basis of the 
interest of the recipient . 
17. Ibid., p. 50. 
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Important effective mechanism for the transfer of 
technological exchange among the countries have been through 
cooperative research and development. Transfer of mechanism 
across different technical fields can be done through 
engineering documents and technical data. Another effective 
means of acquiring technology is by processing equipment 
which is usually done between United States and Israel. But 
this method can be more effective if know-how is also 
transferred through training or other processes along with 
the equipments. Technology transfer can also be done 
through people (know-how), experience information, systems 
information, product information, general information and 
18 
also between companies, industries and nations. 
The history of collaboration in Research and Devel-
opnient between United States and Israel can be traced out 
since the birth of state of Israel. Though they have been 
collaborating in many fields but the most important of them 
is defence. Both, United States and Israel are equally 
important for each other in research and development in the 
sense that if a weapon is developed by United States, Israel 
will work as a laboratory where its performance and 
efficiency can bs checked by suing these weapons against its 
hostile neighbours. Again Israel send to United States many 
18. Ibid., pp. 55-66. 
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Soviet made sophisticated captured weapons like tanks and 
missiles from its neighbours during successive wars to 
improve their own defence technology. In 1975 Dr. Malcolm 
Currie, the then director of defence research and 
engineering, testified before congress: 
"The war has provided much evidence 
which helps to clarify our perspective 
on our own R & D programs... .For the 
most part, the war confirms that the 
United States has been on the right 
track in developing and acquiring 
weapons. In some cases, the war has 
clarified our understanding, and this 
has led....to acceleration of certain 
programs or assignment of high priority 
to certain characteristics in ongoing 
programs." 19 
For example in 1973 war Arabs were successful in hitting 
Israeli targets with the help of Soviet surface to air 
missiles. United States took notice and improved her own 
weapons accordingly. According to John L. Mclucas, former 
Secretary of the Airforce: 
"The Israelis using our equipments 
learned to deal with those systems.... 
The intelligence we have obtained from 
that conflict enabled us to modify our 
electronics jammers and so on to take 
better account of what we know about the 
surface to air missile." 20 
19. Steven L. Spiegel, "U.S. Relations with Israel: the 
Military Benefits", ORBIS: A Journal of World 
Affairs, Vol.30, No.3, Fall 1986, p.478. 
20. Ibid., p. 479. 
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Again during 1982 Lebanon war, Israeli learned 
much from several MIG-23 and MIG-25 air crafts which they 
had short down providing the basis for adjusting operational 
tactics and improving American weaponry to counter equip-
ment of Soviet design. By capturing Soviet T-72 main battle 
tank, Israelis also developed a modified 105 mm shell that 
21 pierced the tank's composite armour. By capturing Soviet 
tanks Israel not only -developed anti-tank innovations or 
weapons for her defence but it provided ground for the sale 
of these weapons to western countries like Canada, West 
22 Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. 
On the basis of Israeli experience, United States 
was able to direct its research and development programmes 
on the right path by cutting expenditure on faulty pro-
grammes. Thus the Israeli experience in the 1967 and 1973 
war strengthened the case for a highly raaneuverable air 
superiority fighter, helping the development of the F-16. 
The 1973 war highlighted the new significance of electronic 
warfare, leading to intensified development of such weapons 
as air-to-ground, antiship, ground-to-air missiles, and 
electronic counter measures. Both wars, in retrospect, 
21. Ibid., p. 479. ' 
22. Ibid. , p. 479; See also W. Seth Carus, "US Procure-
ment of Israeli Defence Goods and Services", AIPAC 
Papers on "US-Israeli Relations", American-Israel 
Public Affairs Committee, Washington DC, 1984 , pp. 
14-15. 
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demonstrated the continued viability of tanks, whose future 
utility many had questioned. For example, Israeli expe-
riences significantly influenced the development of the M-1, 
23 the latest American main battle tank (MBT). 
Substance of all these developments does not mean 
that United States copy Israeli system but it is the Israeli 
experience in combat that identified and influenced 
solutions. For example in 1975, Israeli high command 
received reports that some shells which were the part of 
imported ammunitions from United States were not working 
properly. US government was immediately informed to rectify 
the defect. The experts discovered the fault and corrected 
the defect immediately. This US defected shells were not 
only in Israeli forces but were in Europe and in Korea 
which were direct under Soviet threat. 
Though Israeli technology is quite advanced but its 
rapid evolution has been assisted by technology purchased 
from the USA as well as reverse engineering and copying of 
weapons acquired from the USA and other sources. But the 
thing, which makes Israeli technological infrastructure 
relatively unique is that it absorbs the available 
technology more rapidly, to develop the capability and to 
produce systems such as Scout and Mastiff mini-RPVs which 
23. Gerald M. Steinberg. "The Israeli Arms Industry", 
International Defence Review, February,1982,p.171. 
24. Richard P. Sttebins and Elaine P. Adam, Op. cit., 
p. 481. -^ 
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are not produced elsewhere. Israel also give much impor-
tance to missile research and development. In the 
beginning, only small scale missiles were manufactured but 
after the series of experiment it was able to develop solid 
rocket motors. Solid-state electronic devices developed in 
the USA. were rapidly incorporated into those test rockets 
and other weapons imported by Israel. 
The joint ventures in the. field of technology 
transfers between Israel and United States have also been 
very important. The US electronics firms like General 
Telephone Electronics and Control Data Corporation held 
major interests in Tadiran (electronics) and Elbit 
(computers), and Motorola formed an Israeli subsidiary. 
Israeli partners included large Banks, lAI and firms owned 
25 by the Histadrut. Due to the diversity of Israeli arms 
industry, a single specialized Israeli sub-contractor in the 
area of computers might supply simultaneously equipments for 
military-aircrafts, tanks and patrol boats. Professional 
migrants from all over the world especially from USA and 
USSR have contributed a lot in Israeli R & D programmes who 
have taken professional training or experience abroad. 
25. G.M. Steinberg, Israel: High-technology roulette, 
Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson (eds.), "The Arms 
Production in the Third World", SIPRI (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute), 1986, 
p.171. 
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Israeli experiences are important for the improve-
ment of US equipments to save time and cutting costs, for 
example: 
Israeli air crafts are operated under far more 
severe conditions than those of other nations; they suffer 
"fatigue damage" much earlier when the Israelis expend funds 
refining their American-built aircraft, this knowledge is 
passed on to the United States. The same can be said for 
the operation of American air-to-air and air-to-ground 
missiles. 
Because of budgetary constraints, the Israelis are 
forced to operate American planes more efficiently at lower 
cost than the United States itslef, thereby providing ample 
lessons to be learned on maintenance and readiness. 
Israel discovered problems in the fuel pumps of the 
F-100. The engines for the F-15 and F-16 and it provided 
American engineers with ideas on how to deal with the 
difficulties. In all, the Israelis have made twenty-seven 
substantial recommendations for changes in the F-15. 
The Israelis learned from combat use of the M-60 
tank before the October 1973 war that its hydraulic fluid 
was highly flammable, thereby increasing casualties. This 
discovery lead to the adoption of measures to prevent such 
casualities in the future. Over the years Israel has made 
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114 modifications of the M-48 and M-60 main battle tanks, 
many of which (such as improvements on tank air cleaners 
and the development of new cupolas for the M-48) have been 
adopted by the US army. Israel has also developed many of 
the armoured protection systems in the British and other 
NATO armoured vehicles, which in turn has influenced US 
tanks. 
The ideas of General Israel Tal, father of Israeli 
Merkavah MBT, have influenced the further development of 
German, Swedish, and American tanks and armour tactics. His 
main emphasis is on making the survivability of the crew the 
first priority, accomplished by increasing the vehicle's 
mobility and by leaving as small a target area exposed as 
possible. 
The Israelis have successfully developed dry-clad 
storage for their tanks so that they can be kept in storage 
for years and can still be used quickly in a crisis. 
When the United States built two new airfields in 
the Negev to replace Israelis Sinai facilities (returned to 
Egypt in April 1982), it became clear that Israeli methods 
were cheaper one. Israeli developments in airfield cons-
truction were shared with the Army corps of engineers. 
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When the US army built a new combat training centre 
at Fort Irwin near Barstow, California, the facilities and 
programmes were based generally on Israeli methods. 
There are certain fields in which Israel is even 
advanced to United States like mine and obstacle-clearing 
equipment. A counter obstacle vehicle for use by the army 
corps of engineers is being developed in the United States 
to Israeli technical specifications in an unusual joint 
project. In cooperation with a Pennsylvania-based company, 
B.M.Y., the Israelis are also assisting in the development 
of Heavy Assault Bridge for the United States' newest main 
battle tank, the M-1. In some cases, when USA and Israel 
collaborate in R & D the following pattern occured 
repeatedly: 
(1) The Israelis receive permission to purchase an 
American weapon, for example, the F-15. 
(2) They are allowed to deal directly with the company 
producing the weapon. The Israeli team may request 
particular features in which the Pentagon is not 
interested, or it may be offered features the 
Defence Department was not prepared to develop. 
26. Steven L. Spiegel, Op. cit., p. 484. 
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Often the Israelis are informed that if they will 
pay the research and development costs to build the 
feature for themselves, the American company will 
include the item in their model of the weapon. 
(3) Once the weapons has been built with the feature 
that the Israelis paid to have developed, the 
Pentagon may adopt it for versions of the weapon 
procured for American use. A few recent examples of 
this process include the conformal fuel tanks on the 
F-15, leading edge slats for the F-4E Phanto-, an 
external fuel tank for the M-113A, modification of 
the M-109 self-propelled 155 mm artillery piece, a 
Head-Up Display and a weapons delivery system for 
the A-4N Skyhawk, bomb racks for the F-16, certain 
types of FLIR night vision equipment, and a digital 
27 
weapons delivery system for the F-4 Phantom. 
Though provision for joint R&D were included in 
1979 Memorandum of Understanding but was frozen by United 
States following Israeli capture of Golan Heights. But 
again in 1983 USA agreed on the term that the DoD would 
purchase goods to the value of 15 per cent of Israeli arnis 
imports from the USA in the form of offsets. The agreement 
27. Ibid., p. 483. 
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also included that United States will use Israeli bases and 
ports for the maintenance of US forces in the region. 
United States not only given technology to Israel but it 
also financed some developmental programmes as it provided 
over $ 500 million for R&D on Lavi aircraft. Since 1983, 
United States and Israel have been meeting officially to 
discuss combined planning, joint exercises and preposi-
tioning of US equipment in Israel. Both the countries held 
joint antisubmarine exercises in the Mediterranean and use 
of Israeli hospitals for US forces was also granted. 
The uniqueness of Israel is that by improving older 
weapons it make them up-to-date. This helps United States 
to export these weapons to the poor countries at cheaper 
rates. For example, Israel improved the thirty years old, 
Korean war-vintage tanks M-48, that is still reliable. 
According to Gerald Steinberg: 
"The Israelis have equipped the M-48s 
with new diesel engines, larger 105-
milliraeter guns, new armour, computers, 
laser range finders, and nightvision 
infrared systems. With these additions, 
the "obsolete" M-48 is superior to the 
newer U.S. M-60, and in many respects it 
is equivalent to the improved M-60A3 
still used by the U.S. army".28 
28. Ibid. , p. 487. 
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On the other hand most of the Israeli weapons are 
made of by American engines, the shoat MK-2 APC is equipped 
with U.S. engines and transmission and the Kfir fighter 
plane has a general electric engine. The Dabur class and 
Flagslaff-2 class ships and the Westwind 1124 aircraft have 
been produced in Israel using American technology and under 
29 
a license from the U.S. Some other items are also made 
under license including the M-40 106 mm recoilless rifles, 
AN AWE-1 weapons delivery system for the Skyhawks, KT-70 
30 inertial navigation system, etc. 
Israel indiginously designed and manufactured the 
Merkava, main battle tank, which was successful in peircing 
its armour to Soviet T-72 tanks. The tank composed with 
30,000 parts of which eighty five per cent are Israeli made. 
But the tank is empowered by a U.S. engine. The tank was 
gradually improved. Merkava-I was initially equipped with a 
900 hp motor, Merkava - II was upgraded to 1050 hp and 
Merkava - III is designed for 1200 hp and is equipped with a 
120 mm gun. Israel also developed 105-ram armour-peircing, 
finstabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) round on the basis 
29. G.M. Steinberg, Op. cit. , No.25, pp. 330-332. 
30. Baek, Mc Laurin & Moon (eds.), Op. cit., p.143, 
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of the captured Soviet weapons and by Joint US - Israeli 
31 technological development. 
Israel also developed air-to-air missiles, like 
Shafrir 2 and the pythen 3 on the basis of U.S. Sidewinder 
air-to-air missies. It features infra-red homing (thus fire 
and forget) and has a range of 5 k-. Israel also collabo-
rate with United States for the development of small combat 
boats. Israeli boats Dabur was first designed and 
manufactured in U.S.A. Again both the countries joined for 
the further development of the Siar large patrol craft 
32 (Saar-5). The Navy of the United States was so much 
impressed by Israeli military products that it entered with 
an agreement in April, 1985 for the Joint development of a 
number of weapons system like a new ship-to-ship raissle, 
33 
electronic decoys and submarines. 
Israel also transfers innovations, advanced main-
tenance and repair technologies to the United States. 
Israeli Aircraft Industry developed netallurgical heat 
treatments that increase the lifetiire of turbine engines by 
31. G.M. Steinberg, Op. cit., No.25, p. 176. 
32. Ibid., pp. 178-179. 
33. Steven L. Spiegel, Op. cit., p. 487. 
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reducing blade "creep", which is the slow deformation of 
these crucial Jet engines components. Israeli also 
developed improved fuel-nozzle rings for the A-4 Skyhawk 
using electron beam welding techniques. Later these 
techniques were adopted by many U.S. companies including 
Pratt & Whitney, one of U.S. largest and most important Jet 
engines manufacturers. 
Israeli military medicine expertise also assisted 
United States, providing means of saving lives in emergen-
cies, in which United States has had less experience. Thus 
Israel's advance technical capabilities gives the close and 
growing level of cooperations with the United States. 
Further new technologies that emerge from this enterprise 
will necessarily be shared. Similarly, in 1986 Israel 
formally became part of the U.S. Strategic Defence 
Initiative Programme. 
Israel's increasing military equipment sale to 
United States was opposed by U.S. weapon manufacturer 
because Israel can provide the equivalent or better services 
at a lower price. These pressure,however,could not prevent 
Boeing, manufacturer of the AWACS, from purchasing Israeli 
35 
equipment and selling technology to Israeli firms. 
34. Ibid., pp. 484-485. 
35. G.M. Steinberg, Op. cit., No.25, p. 188. 
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Technical Exchange: Education and Training: 
Despite of all the above-mentioned Defence Colla-
borations in Research and Development, both the countries 
have also been collaborating in the field of defence 
education and training. Israeli technical experts or armed 
forces personnels' official visits to U.S. government or 
defence department contract facilities and visits by 
American specialists in military technology to Israel are 
helpful to each other. Most of the Israeli students in 
United States get enrolled themselves in technical fields 
like physical sciences, life sciences and especially 
engineering. "Military education/training exchanges between 
Israel and the United States are also extensive. In 
conjunction with the FMS program, IDF personnel submit 
requests to visit government or government contractor 
facilities. Such exchanges include visits to senior staff 
headquarters (eg., U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 
military Operations - DCSOPS), commands (eg. Array Material 
Command - AMC, U.S. Array Electronics Command, Tank 
Automotive Command, Naval Air Systens Command), ter:ninals 
(eg. Mobile Army Terminal) and depots (eg. Pueblo Army 
Depot), military research and development laboratories 
(eg. Natick and Harry Diamond Laboratories, Naval Surface 
Weapons Center) and facilities (eg. Eglin Air Force Base), 
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as well as the major army (eg. Ft. Rucker, Oackland Army 
Base), Navy (eg. Pensacola Naval Air Station), and air-
force (eg. Wright - Patternson Air Force Base) installa-
tions. Contractor facilities visit include such corpora-
tions as Colins Radio, General Electric, General Dynamics, 
Grumman, Hazeltine, Mc Donnell Douglas, Litton, Mitre 
Rocketdyne, Sperry and Westinghouse". Such type of visits 
are coordinated by the Israeli Purchasing Mission in New 
York. Its main purpose is to maintain contact with defence 
facilities and defence contractors and conducting R&D 
associated with, systems acquired or to be acquired by 
Israel. 
Substantial numbers of American technical defence 
experts visit Israel each year as well. A broad array of 
technical fields is covered, and many of the visiting 
Americans are invited to present papers. While in Israel 
the visitor interacted with various research groups at the 
Weizman Institute, Hebrew University, and Ben Gurion 
37 University. 
Again, Israeli intelligence officials too have 
contacted many times to the American citizen of Jewish 
36. Baek, Mc Laurin and Moon, Op. cit., pp. 76-77. 
37. Ibid., p. 77. 
101 
origin working in American defence contractor facilities for 
38 
military R&D technology information directly. Israeli 
scientists and professors often visit to United States and 
interact with their counterparts in technical matters 
related to their fields and thus contribute more to the 
Israeli technical know-how. 
Co-operative Research and Development: 
Another mean by which America and Israel co-ope-
rate is through enterprises. Such relationships involve 
American firms and Israeli subsidiaries but it is not always 
followed. A number of Israeli subsidiaries of U.S. corpo-
rations in the fields such as electronics, computers and 
communication have played an active role in the Israeli 
Defence Industry for some years. 
The best way for Israel to acquire military 
technology from the United States, however, is through co-
production and licensing. Aware of the economic and 
political problems involved in continuing to develop the 
Defence Industry, Israel sought to solve those problems by 
reaching co-production agreements with American firms. 
This could have saved the Israeli Defence Complex, the R&D 
38. Ibid., p.78. 
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expenses in acquiring advance technology. Moreover, such an 
arrangement would have diminished the chances of an American 
39 
veto on sales abroad. Thus Technical Assistance and 
Lisensing Agreements (TALAS) are the most important ways for 
the technology transfer and reflect growth in activity and 
increase in the field of technology. 
U.S. financial aid to Israel might not be a direct 
mode for the technology transfer but one proportion of this 
economic aid, however, is directly associated with tech-
nology transfer, for example, through the Israel - United 
States Binational Industrial Research and Developnent 
Foundation. This foundation is a mutual technology exchange 
institution in the private sector. It exchanges some 
proposed military research and development projects but it 
41 is mostly related to energy. 
U.S. Arms for Israel: 
The evolution of U.S. arms supply to Israel could be 
seen in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its 
implications for U.S. objectives in the region. Moreover, 
39. Ephraim Inbar, "The American Arms Transfer to 
Israel", Middle East Review, XV, 1-2, Fall 1982/ 
Winter 1982-83 , p.47. 
40. Baek, Mc Laurin and Moon, Op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
41. Ibid., p. 80. 
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Israel's geographic location, along with its military 
facilities, offers the United States a good base, should 
intervention in the Arabian Peninsula be necessary. 
Disappointed by the radical attitude of the Arabs and Soviet 
expansion in the region, President John F. Kennedy started 
arms supply to Israel to a large extent. In 19625a deal of 
$ 25 million was completed which included the Hawk missiles. 
In 1966, United States further supplied A-4 Skyhawks. 
Parker T-Hart, president of the Middle East Institute, 
Washington D.C. and former U.S. Ambassader to Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait offered four reasons for the supply of 
major weaponry to Israel: 
(1) The introduction of more sophisticated conven-
tional weaponry by the USSR into Egypt and Syria 
during the early 1960's. 
(2) The attempt by Nasser to form a unified command 
over eastern Arab armies in 1964 and the active 
effort by the USSR (and Nasser) to switch Jordan 
and Lebanon from Western to Soviet weaponry. 
(3) The increasing reluctance of Western European states 
such as France, West Germany, Belgium and Sweden to 
42. Harvey Sicherraan, "The United States and Israel: A 
Strategic Divide", ORBIS - 24(2) Summer, 1980, pp. 
388-389. 
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make new arms sales to Israel and suffer the Arab 
boycott or a break in Arab relations. All Western 
and Far Eastern arms sales to Israel ceased after 
the six day war. 
(4) The re-doubled efforts of the pro-Israel lobby in 
the United States, intended to bind the United 
States to Israel's supply needs as the USSR has been 
43 bound to Egypt's. 
President Nixon said that Israel must possess 
sufficient military power to deter an attack. By sufficient 
power, he meant that as long as the threat of Arab attack 
remained direct and imminent, the military balance must be 
tipped in Israel's favour. "I support a policy that would 
give Israel a technical military margin to more than offset 
her hostile neighbour's numerical superiority". He 
added.'^ '^  
After the June 1967 war, United States again started 
arms supply to Israel in response of the Soviet arms supply 
to Egypt and Syria. In 1968, on the request of Israel, 
Johnson-administration agreed for the sale of 50 Phantom 
43. R.C. Gupta, "American Arms in West Asia", Puneet 
Publications, India, 1985, pp. 136-137. 
44. Ibid., pp. 141-142. 
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Jets and 25 additional Skyhawks to Israel. On the event of 
the 'War of Attribution', President Nixon said that United 
States was prepared to supply military equipment to friendly 
country like Israel for the safety of her people. 
United States provided to Israel new Phantom Jets 
that were fitted with a pod of Electronic Center Measures 
(ECMs) which could enable pilots to have warning when 
attacked by an enemy missile. Pods that were capable of not 
only detecting but also diverting oncoming missiles were 
also supplied. The U.S. administration also provided new 
version of Skyhawks bombers. The smaller and slower but 
highly manoeuvrable Skyhawks, reputed to be one of the best 
allround tactical bombers in the world, were fitted with 
ECM pods. With the help of these sophisticated aircrafts 
Israel was able to hit the Egyptian radar positions and.' thus 
enabling the Israeli pilots to have almost untramelled 
freedom in Egyptian air space. 
United States did not disclose officially about the 
arms supply to Israel during the war of attrition but 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 
its publicati ons entitled 'the Arras Trade with the Third 
world', claimed that the U.S. government had provided to 
45. Edgar 0. Ballance, "The Electronic War in the Middle 
East, 1968-70" , London, 1974 , p.102. 
46. Ibid. , p. 102. 
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Israel 18 additional Phantoms, 18 additional Skyhawks, 
Shrike air-to-surface missiles and Walleye glide bombs for 
use against the SAMs, alongwith M-60 main battle tanks, 
47 helicopters and other equipments. 
The successive governments in United States became 
very much keen on the survival and security of Israel. This 
was done through arming that country considerably and this 
has continued to be the main plank of her foreign policy. 
From 1947 to 1952 the U.S. supported Israel on almost all 
the issues of crucial interest to the Jewish state. U.S. 
became major arms supplier under the Kennedy and Johnson 
administration. After the 1967 war, Nixon's doctrine 
further qualified to her earlier stand. President Carter 
described Israel as an strategic asset to the U.S. According 
to President Reagan: 
"Israel perhaps is the only remaining 
strategic asset in the region on which 
U.S. can truly rely....Only by full 
appreciation of the critical role, the 
state of Israel plays in our strategic 
calculus, can we build the foundation for 
thwarting Moscow's designs on territories 
and resources vital to our security and 
our national well-being".48 
47. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), "The Arms Trade With the Third World", 
Sweden, 1971 , pp. 534-535. 
48. David Mc Dowall, "Palestine and Israel: The Uprising 
and Beyond", I.B. Tauris & Co., London, 1989, p.46. 
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Jewish lobby in United States also put pressure on 
the U.S. administration for the supply of arms to Israel. 
On the eve of the election of 1972, president Nixon agreed 
to provide 42 F-4s and 82 A-4s planes to Israel for the pur-
49 pose to enlist the. support of the American Jewry. 
Kissinger also supported U.S. arms supply to Israel and said 
that the "Soviets would have to learn that the position of 
their clients could not be improved through procrastination; 
the Arabs must not win with Soviet weapons or they would 
become intractable". Thus Nixon administration agreed to 
provide limited arms - 80 Sidewinder missiles and bomb-
racks - to Israel. Israel was also assured of replacement 
of heavy equipment destroyed during the 1973 war. 
The National Security Council and the Pentagon 
decided to provide "Nickel Grass" air craft to Israel. 
President Nixon also authorized shipments to Israel of 
material costing $ 825 million including transportation 
during 1973 war. Israeli forces were also provided some 
major items which included conventional munitions of many 
types - air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, 
standard range of fighter aircraft ordinance, replacements 
49. R.C. Gupta, Op. cit. , p. 159. 
50. Ibid., p. 175. 
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for tanks, aircrafts, radios and other military equipment 
which had been lost in action. At least 600 U.S. tanks 
valued at sum $ 250 million were sent to Israel during 1973 
war. During the war the U.S. also sent its higli-f lying 
strategic reconnaissance aircraft, the SR-71 over the 
Egyptian front. The information gathered by these aircrafts 
52 
were a great help to the Israeli forces. 
Post 1973 period witnessed massive arms race in the 
West Asia vis-a-vis U.S. arms supply to Israel. As stated 
by the former Israeli Dsfence Minister, Shimon Peres, 'the 
overall Israeli capability (upto mid 1976) compared with the 
pre-war levels rose by about 30 per cent, its artillery by 
about 25 per cent, its Armoured Personnel Carriers inventory 
by about 60 per cent, its combat planes by about 15 per cent, 
53 
and its war vassels by 45 per cent'. 
Though the exact figure of U.S. arms transfer to 
Israel in post 1973 war is not available, however, according 
to SIPRI yearbook of 1978, the following munition subse-
quently were supplied to Israel, as follows: Raytheon 
AIM-7F, Sparrow Air-to-Air nissiles, Raytheon AIM-9L side-
winder Air-to-Air missiles, Boeing - Vertol CH-47C Chinook 
51. Ibid. , pp. 192-193. 
52 . Saad E s h a z l y , "The Arab M i l i t a r y Option", American 
Middle E a s t R e s e a r c h , San F r a n c i s c o , 1986, p . 8 4 . 
5 3 . R.C. G u p t a , Op. c i t . , p . 1 9 3 . 
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Helicopters, "Dabur-77" coastal patrol boats, Grumman E - 2C 
Airborne warning control system (AWACS), Mc Donnell 
Douglas F - 15 A Eagle Fighter interceptor, Sikorsky HH-53C 
Flint Helicopter, Lockheed KC-130H Tanker/Transport, Ford 
M - 109 155 - mm Howitzer, Ford M - 113 AI Armoured car, 
Mc Donnell - Douglas RGM - 84 A Harpoon Shrike air-to-ground 
missiles, Sikorsky S - 61R Helicopter amphibious transport, 
54 Mc Donnell - douglas TF - 15 A Eagle Combat trainer. 
Again in 1975, Israel was provided with the F-15A Eagle 
fighter interceptor and in 1976 AWACS aircraft was also 
promised. 
The rapid growth in American assistance to Israel 
can be seen that after the first three years of 1967 war, it 
was $ 40 million a year and in the next three years it 
averaged about $ 400 million nearly 28 per cent of her total 
defence expenditure and in 1974-75 it averaged about $ 1.5 
billion raising it to 42 per cent of her defence 
spendings. 
During the administration of Nixon and Ford United 
States extended a significant amount of arms and ammunition 
to Israel both on grant and sales basis. United States 
54. SIPRI, "World Armament and Disarmament", London, 
197S , p. 267. 
55. Nadav Safran, Op. cit. , p. 316. 
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supplied arms to Israel even when there was no treaty about 
arms transfer between the two countries. Finally amendment 
in Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 finished the legal 
hinderence on arms sale and thus cleared the way for the 
massive U.S. arms supply to Israel. During the visit of 
Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and Defence Minister Arens to 
Washington in Novembe 1983, President Reagan signed an 
agreement on strategic co-operation. The accord provided 
for the creation of a Joint Committee to coordinate the 
military efforts of Joint military exercises, the sharing of 
intelligence, and the stockpilling of American arms and 
ammunition on Israeli territory. 
In May 1986 Israel Joined the U.S. Strategic 
Defence Initiative (SDI) programme with its potential for 
applying ATBM technology to countering the SSM challange to 
Israel. The Congress of United States also approved $ 180 
million for Israel to develop a defensive system against 
short range missiles and thus making for the country's entry 
into what is popularly known as Star War programme. 
Even after Israel's consistent refuse to sign Non-
prolifiration Treaty of inspection of its nuclear facility 
at Dimona by the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
56. M. Sid - Ahmad, Reagan Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East, in H. Kochler, (ed.)^ "The Reagan Adminis-
tration's Foreign Policy: Facts and Judgement of 
the International Tribunal". Third World Centre, New 
York, 1984, p. 221. 
I l l 
United States never showed any intention to cut financial 
or military aid to Israel. Contrary to the U.S. policy to 
oppose nuclear proliferation, the Congress has purposely 
remained silent about Israel's nuclear capabilities despite 
the CIA's comprehensive report that Israel was producing 
nuclear weapons. 
57. James G. Abourezk, "U.S. - Israeli Relationship: A 
Historical Perspective", Journal of South Asian and 
Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. XIV, No.l, Fall 1990, 
pp. 31-32. 
58. Ibid., pp. 31-32, 
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CHAPTER - IV 
THE ISRAELI CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS 
The civil-military relations, like other aspects of 
Israel's political structure, are basically the outcome of 
the organizational and political patterns crystallized 
during the period of the Yishuv (The name given to the 
Jewish community in Palestine from the beginning of the 
waves of Zionist immigration at the turn of the century 
until the establishment of the State ). Throughout the 
Yishuv period there were two schools of thought concerning 
the position of the military. The first held that military 
force is the instrument of the political authority; the 
second that the armed forces should enjoy organizational and 
political independence, and power not only tc determine 
methods of implementing violent policies buz also to 
formulate actual political goals and aims. 
In the beginning of 20th century, the first nucleus 
of a Jewish military force in Palestine began to develop 
which produced the 'nation building elite' or the founding 
fathers of Israeli society. The Yishuv became nore active 
1. Yigal Elam, "The Haganah, the Zionist Way to Power", 
(Hebrew), Tel Aviv, Zmora, Bitan Modan, 1979 , pp. 
321-30. 
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due to Arab hostility and to the needs of the stuggle for 
independence against the British Mandatory Authority. In 
these circumstances, Yishuv's central military force, the 
Haganah, was characterized by the transfer of jurisdiction 
to a more central political body with a wider basis of 
legitimacy. 
In 1905, the Poale Zion party created the first 
self-defence groups in Palestine which was later displaced 
by a self-defence society called Hashomer (The watchman 
which emerged in 1909) . The proposal of 1912 shows the 
ideology and objectives of Hashomer as follows: (1) 
Hashomer will not limit its role to physical protection of 
the Jewish settlements; it must inculcate into these people 
the consciousness that they must defend themselves. 
(2) Hashomer must provide the nucleus for the widening of 
the defensive functions of the Jewish community. 
(3) Hashomer has to have a monopoly over the defence of the 
Jewish community of Palestine. (4) Therefore. Hashomer nust 
serve as the professional conspiratorial armed force of the 
Yishuv. To accomplish these objectives, Hashomer, acting as 
a secret society, also established the organizational and 
2 
procedural paraphernalia for such activity. 
2. Amos Perlmutter, "Military & Politics in Israel", 
Nation-Building and Role Expansion, Frank Cass, 
1969, pp. 5-6. 
114 
Despite Hashomer and Haganah, there were two small 
dissident organizations: the Irgun Zvai Leumi, better known 
as the Irgun and Lochamei Herut Yisrael known as Lechi or as 
the Stern Gang. In the early 1920s the Socialist-Zionist 
leaders tried for the creation of an all-inclusive political 
party which would integrate all major interest groups. And 
finally they established Ahdut Ha-Avoda (United Labour 
Party) in 1919 and Histadrut in 1920. The merger of civil 
and military can be seen in 1921 when the platform of the 
United Labour Party took stock of the situation and a 
committee was formed by Eliahu Golomb and Dov Hoz to work 
for the creation of a 'defence society'. Again after the 
Arab riots in 1920-21, Hashomer attempted to establish an 
'independent defence party' allegedly with the support of 
the Comintern. 
In the absence of sovereign, governmental frame-
work for the Yishuv, the initiative cane from several 
political bodies, primarily the Histadrut which created 
the Haganah defence force that served as the foundation of 
the Israeli Defence Force in 1948. Haganah and other 
organizations such as the Itzel and the Lehi had a distinct 
political coloration. This retarded the development of 
professional military autonomy due to considerable weight 
3. Ibid., p. 12. 
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given to political and party considerations in appointments 
and in defining operative goals. The prolonged conflict, 
particularly the three-year Arab revolt 1936-39 required 
close cooperation between the professional military cadre 
that emerged in the Haganah and the political leadership. 
An assessment of civil-military relations in Israel should 
focus on the growth of autonomous professional and political 
security organization; which began as a series of spon-
taneous, voluntaristic, task-oriented individuals, groups 
and developed into a complex, self-sustaining and highly 
institutionalized military (1909-1948). Amos Perlmutter in 
his second book 'Politics and the Military in Israel 
1967-77', classified and generalised it in the following 
ways: (1) The birth of the early security organizations and 
the rivalries that existed among them, (2) the campaign to 
dominate and politicize the Haganah, (3) The counter effort 
to keep the Haganah a purely professional organization, and 
(4) the transformation of Haganah's High Command into 
Zahal's High Command. 
Thus pre-independence era is related to the post-
independence era in the sense that in the former organi-
zations were non-complex and in the latter the reverse was 
true. The way state of Israel emerged led the inter-
dependence of civil and military authorities on each other. 
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Both influencing each other in relation to war, strategy, 
diplomacy and the conduct of international conflict. 
Civil-Military Relation After the 
Creation of the State of Israel: 
Since its establishment in 1948, the civil-military 
relation in Israel has a unique character. It has a 
professional, a political army under the institutionalized 
and objective control of the elected political authorities, 
imbued with the values of the civil culture-like the armies 
4 
of modern western countries. 
The close relationship between civil and military in 
Israel does not mean that it has transformed into a garrison 
state. The threat which is perceived fror, its neighbours 
compelled it for a closer relationship between civilians and 
military establishments and thus its army became a 'citizen 
army'. The Israeli army does not reflect a class, social, 
ethnic or other group, but rather represents the entire 
community. Though Israeli army is run by a small 
professional group, it is based on universal obligation and 
is not a closed institution, but is open to the society 
around it. 
Amos Perlmutter, "Military and Politics in Israel", 
Op. cit., pp. 123-24. 
E.O. Schild, 'On the Meaning of Military Service in 
Israel', in Michael Curtis and Mordehai Schertoff 
(eds.), "Israel, Social Structure and Change", New 
Brunswick, New Jersey, Transactior. Books, 1973 , 
pp. 419-32. 
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Again, 'centrality of security' plays a vital role 
in military and political concept of national defence and 
made security a vitally important factor in the political 
system. Success in fulfilling security functions became the 
supreme test of the political leadership and the guarantee 
of political stability - so much so that Israeli foreign 
policy was enslaved to considerations of defence policy. 
As described by a disciple of Ben Gurion, Moshe Dayan that 
'small nations do not have a foreign policy, they have 
defence policy'. Consequently, decisions on military actions 
were sometimes taken not only out of purely professional, 
military considerations, but as a reaction to domestic needs 
such as the fortifying of national morale, in response to 
political pressure groups, to release military tensions, or 
because the political leadership needed to demonstrate 
forcefulness. In addition to the political impact of the 
military, military also influenced many sectors of society. 
It has its influence on leadership and administrative 
styles, which is, in turn, reflected in work patterns, 
organizational procedures, interpersonal relations, semantic 
codes and terminology. Officers bring these values with 
6. Sharett, Personal Diary, p. 950. 
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them when they leave the IDF and start new careers in the 
public or private sector. This explains why the army can 
influence Israeli policy-making in the security field above 
and beyond the level usually acceptable in similar 
democracies. 
The Israeli Defence Service Law also makes a great 
contribution for the public involvement in defence services. 
All the permanent residents who are Jews are obliged to 
serve even though not citizen of Israel. Military service 
in Israel indicates proximity to the supreme values of 
society, and the greater the contribution by an individual 
or group to the military, the stronger is the expression of 
his closeness to the centre. 
The 'Security' which is very important for the 
Israeli society, and which led the Israeli army to play a 
more dominant role, could be interpreted in many ways. The 
distinction between what falls within and what outside the 
security ambit is not an institutional one, but analytic 
between sectors. Not only is the army entrusted vith 
carrying out security functions, there are also civilian 
institutions whose functions include security. It is not 
Moshe Lissak, 'Paradoxes of Israeli Civil-Military 
Relations: An Introduction. Edited by Moshe Lissak, 
"Israeli Society and Its Defence Establishment", 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1984 , pp. 6-7. 
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the wearing of uniform, nor working in an army camp, nor 
being subjected to the jurisdiction of military law that 
identifies those who deals with security; it is the 
political elite that decides what falls within the security 
sphere. And as that decision is made within the political 
system, it has become a topic for dispute between political 
groups, rather than between civilians on the one hand and 
armed forces on the other. David Ben Gurion, the first 
Israeli Prime Minister, described the security in the 
analytical perception rather than the institutional one and 
wanted to expand the boundaries of security as much as 
possible. Shimon Peress, who was successively the Director 
General of the Ministry of Defence, the Deputy Minister and 
the Minister of Defence, described the security as: 
"The security of Israel implies immig-
ration, and it means settlement. 
Security includes control of the sea and 
the air .... Security is the development 
of scientific research and scientific 
aptitude in all disciplines - Physics, 
Chemistry, Biology and advanced techno-
logy. The security of Israel is the 
mobilization of our youth and the 
involvement of the people and its 
scholars in the pursuit of difficult and 
vital objectives - settlement, defence 
and integration of the exiles. Security 
is not limited function but a multiple 
effort; it is like a high-tension cable, 
concentrating national energy and using 
it to reinforce the nation's ability to 
survive. It is both existing energy and 
potential energy".8 
8"! Shi.-on Peress, "From These Men", London. Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1979 , pp.47-48. 
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Thus Shimon Peress claimed that self-defence, like 
self-work, was an expression of the creation of a 'New Jew' 
and a new Jewish society. There are some areas in which 
role of military is relatively wide, between the civil and 
military sectors, which can be analysed both in terms of 
time and space. As regards time, there are para-military 
and post-military organizations and arrangements, for 
example, Gadna (Youth Battalions) and Hamishmar Haezrahi 
(Civil Defence), which recruits many people beyond the age 
of compulsory service. Another manifestation is the 
arrangement whereby senior officers retiring from the army 
receive a year's leave during which they remain under 
military jurisdiction, but do not wear uniform and have no 
military function. The spatial dimension of the 'grey area' 
is shown in many semi-military activities. It is manifested 
by the frequent changes that the Israeli undergoes from 
being a civilian to being a soldier, as was vividly 
expressed by the aphorism coined by the former Chief of 
Staff Yadin: 'The Israeli citizen is a doldier on eleven 
months' annual leave'. Thus having developed a social 
The organization was established because of the 
increase terrorist attacks within Israel in 1974. By 
1977 it encompassed some 40,000 volunteers, of whom 
some 1000 worked full or part-time for remuneration. 
Despite its military function of guarding against 
sabotage by enemies from outside, it actually 
fulfils police patrolling function as well. 
121 
system, IDF has developed an intricate and complex 
relationships with Israeli society on a personal, ideolo-
gical and institutional level. 
However, there have been two types of military 
officers in post-independent era in Israeli politics. The 
first group was consisted of those officers-politicians who 
belonged to the pre-state generation, when the military was 
still an instrument of the Yishuv political system (person 
like Dayan, Allen, Galili and Carmel, who established their 
reputations in both the underground military force and in 
Labour Socialist Politics). In the pre-state Yishuv period 
civil-military functions were combined. But after 1948 they 
have been functionally and organizationally separated. Thus 
depoliticization and nationalization of the IDF created a 
new group of officers and a new type of professional, civil 
oriented officers, who were not involved in party politics 
before 1948. Rabin, Bar-her, Yariv, Lahat, Sharon, Pa'il 
and Geva are all products of the post-1948 generation, 
without having experience in pre-state party politics. The 
role of these two groups in Israeli politics was unsurpassed 
in two areas: The formulation and implementation of 
national strategy and security and in leading a peoples' 
10. Amos Perlmutter, "Military & Politics in Israel" 
Op. cit., p. 132. 
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reserve army successfully in two wars, (1956 and 1967). The 
1973 war further elevated the political assets of the 
military. Successive Arab-Israeli wars further enhanced the 
military position vis-a-vis the position of generals in 
Israel. For example, the reputation of General Ariel (Arik) 
Sharon, the conquerer of the Egyptian west bank of the 
canal, had grown proportionately to his stunning military 
success. Again, the reputation of Bar-Lev was also enhanced 
by his resumption of military duty during the Syrian-
Egyptian surprise attack. The position of General Yariv, as 
an advisor to the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister, 
and his role as negotiator with the Egyptian Third Army, 
was also enhanced. But, on the other hand, the reputation 
of Dayan suffered to a great extent due to the fact that as 
a Defence Minister, he failed to alert the IDF and so 
prepared the military for the initiative, and above all, 
that he failed to prevent the all-but-catastrophic conduct 
11 
of the first days of the war. 
Thus, the young retired military technocratic-
professional elite who knew well about the strategy 
security, were regarded as suitable for political tasks and 
to ably check the growing party nepotism. Thus if this 
11. Amos Perlmutter, "Politics and the Military in 
Israel" 1957-77, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London, 
1978 , pp. 190-91. 
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state has to survive, it must produce thinking officers, 
one who has so far demonstrated the greates dedication to 
the public interest, as well as remarkable personal 
integrity, courage, and political consciousness. These 
qualities were taken seriously by the Israeli electorate 
which hoped that the retired officers would considerably 
contribute to reforming, rejuvenating, and invigorating 
Israel's petrified institutionalized political parties. For 
the Israelis this was the promise to be kept by war heroes. 
On the other hand, the rival political groups tried to 
build up their influence within the army by winning over the 
high command. In that way, the two main contending 
alliances of civilians and officers were crystallized. 
Inside each coalition civilian politicians were behind the 
political mobilization of generals, but they had to pay a 
double price when gaining the officers' support. Firstly, 
they had to reward individuals by supporting their pro-
fessional advancement; secondly, they granted to the amy 
itself a large degree of operational freedom and the 
capacity to influence its civilian counterparts in the 
widest sphere of national security. Thus the standing of 
the officer crops was raised and it became an equal partner 
with the political leadership. Since 1957, when the pattern 
of 'second career' was introduced in IDF, hundreds of high 
ranking officers in their earlv fourties have been 
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discharged from the army and entered the civilian work 
market (in the last decade alone, these have included 
approximately 100 officers of the rank of brigadier general 
or higher). Between the years 1949 and 1981, over 20 per 
cent of these officers entered into politics and till date 
12 the majority of them are enjoying high party positions. 
Dominance of Military: 
The expansion of the role of IDF started immediately 
after it was established in 1948. In the early fifties, 
the IDF assumed the role that was political in nature mainly 
because of the problems raised by mass immigration and 
difficult economic situation at home. In the sixties, its 
role-expansion comparatively slowed down, but the seventies 
saw a renewed spread. The extension in the army educational 
activities (such projects as taking in 'marginal' youth and 
offering a rehabilitation programme) was in line with the 
IDF's tradition of 'civil' educational activity, the army 
also ventured into hitherto unexplored areas of a nore 
political and public nature. The flexible nature of the 
boundaries of 'security' and the fact that they are 
12. Yoram Peri, Party-Military Relations in a Pluralist 
System, (ed.) by Moshe Lissak, "Israeli Society and 
its Defence Establishment", Op. cit. , p. 58. 
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variously defined in different situations, has enabled the 
army to penetrate with relative ease into areas that, in 
other societies, are generally regarded as political. 
The position of military again enhanced or rather 
became dominant due to the tasks assumed by the IDF as an 
army of occupation - to maintain law and order, to prevent 
demonstrations, to restrict the movement of Arab inhabitants 
of the occupied territories, to intervene physically when 
attempts were made to resist land-seizure orders etc. These 
functions were accepted by the public as essential so long 
as the occupation itself was held to be vital for Israel's 
security. Despite the security matters, IDF also plays a 
vital role in long-range strategic planning, including its 
social and economic aspects. 
The defence establishment also plays a greater role 
to enhance the military position as about 25 per cent of 
the labour force works directly or indirectly in the 
defence establishment, for example, niembers of the permanent 
army, civilian workers in the IDF and the Defence Ministry 
and the man power in the defence industries etc. Massive 
arms export also contributed a lot to the development of 
13. Moshe Lissak, Op. cit., p. 7. 
14. Ibid., p. 8. 
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Israeli economy. Thus it is the defence establishment which 
really possess enormous amount of economic power. Any major 
economic shift in the defence establishment, such as large 
cut in the defence budget, would immediately create problems 
like unemployment or fluctuations in the balance of payments 
on country's foreign currency reserves. Due to these 
reasons heads of the defence establishment compell the civil 
government for its greater share in the budget. Ben Gurion, 
the first Prime Minister and Defence Minister, also 
supported the role expansion of the IDF and said, "without 
universal military service Israel would probably find it 
impossible to achieve a minimum standard of citizenship for 
individuals from forty diverse lands....The military 
establishment provides the only point on which all citizens 
15 
merge under one system, one command and one objective." 
Since 1967 war, Military Generals gained consider-
able influence in security policy-making and iinple-entation. 
In the social-ethnic field, as well as in dealing with 
problems of health and welfare, the officers have gained 
considerable experience through their daily contact with 
recruits, and this experience enabled them to nake a claim 
15. David C. Rapoport, A Comparative Theory of Military 
and Political Types, in Samuel P. Huntington (ed. ) 
"Changing Patterns of Military Politics". New York, 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962 , p.85. 
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for political office. According to Amos Perlmutter: 
"Israel officers are trained not only as 
technologists of warfare, but also as 
human leaders; as junior officer they are 
incharge of recruits who represent the 
citizenry of Israel, where conscription 
is universal between the ages of 18-21, 
for both men and women, and where the 
reserve army of some 400,000 meets the 
small (40,000) professional officer 
core....Officers thus become experts in 
personal therapy and social welfare, and 
are trained to pay particular attention 
to conscripts coming from deprived Afro-
Asian Jewish background, who constitute 
a sizeable number of the recruit 
intake."16 
These social-welfare functions taken up by IDF 
Officers have enhanced their position in Israeli society and 
this enabled these officials to enter into politics. The IDF 
became a political factor not only for the inhabitants in 
the territories, but also in relation to the entire 
political system in Israel. 
After the June 1967 war, a Military Government was 
formed in the occupied territories i.e. Golan Heights, the 
Gaza Strip, Sinai and the West Bank, which operated in three 
areas: security, administration and institutional change. 
16. Amos Perlmutter, "Politics and the Military in 
Israel", 1967-77, Op. cit., pp. 192-93. 
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Firstly, the IDF had to guard and secure the ceasefire lines 
against belligerent actions either by the standing armies of 
the Arabs states or by irregular groups. It had also to 
secure law and order inside the occupied territories and to 
protect the state of Israel from terrorist sabotage-actions 
that originated in the territories. Secondly, the Military 
Government had to perform administrative functions for the 
local population at their national or local level. Israel 
did not perceive that role as static, but acted dynamically 
to develop the territories and the municipal services. 
Finally, institutional changes implemented by the IDF were 
made not for the welfare of the local inhabitants, but to 
consolidate Israeli interests in the territories. 
Thus, all the four occupied regions had a Military 
Governor who was at the apex of the Military Government in 
that particular district and (operated) under the law 
virtually as a head of state. The Military Governor had 
a command and staff structure similar to all other IDF 
units, and in addition had a staff arm that represented the 
different Israeli civil ministers. 
The most important functionary in the Military 
Government was the coordinator, who was a major-general 
17. Brig-Gen. Shlomo Gazit, "The Administered Terri-
tories: Policy and Action", Maarahot, 204, 1970 . 
p.27. 
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responsible for the Military Government. He headed the 
Military Government Division of the General Staff, and as 
such participated in General Staff meetings and was the 
Chief of Staff's senior advisor on issues relating to the 
Occupied Territories. At the same time he was the Defence 
Minister's assistant as head of the Ministry's unit for the 
coordination of the activities in the West Bank. 
Israeli military did not only perform welfare 
functions or not only confined to captured territories but 
its senior officers entered into government and their 
numbers considerably increased. "Out of 66 Cabinet 
Ministers who joined the 'Cabinets since 1955, 10 of them, 
15 per cent, were professional officers. The relatively 
proportion of officers increased in the higher echelons of 
the political elite, not only in a comparison of Knesset and 
Cabinet, but also in the distribution of portfolios within 
the latter. Out of twenty people who held the senior posts 
in the Cabinet, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, 
Defence and Foreign Affairs Minister, seven of them, 35 per 
cent, were professional officers. In this respect their 
preponderance grew as the years passed. Untill the 
fourteenth Cabinet in 1967, former officers filled second-
rank posts: Transport, Tourisa, Labour and Education. In 
that year, Moshe Dayan was given the defence portfolio for 
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the first time, and since the number of officers in central 
ministerial posts has risen gradually. In 1969 Yigal Allon 
was Deputy Premier, and Moshe Dayan Minister of Defence. In 
1974 Yitzhak Rabin was Premier, and Allon Deputy Premier 
and Foreign Minister. In 1977 Yadin was Deputy Premier, 
Dayan Foreign Minister, and Ezer Weizman Minister of 
Defence. Furthermore, in that Cabinet yet another officer 
was given a political-security position. Major-General Arik 
Sharon was originally appointed as Minister of Agriculture, 
but took on responsibility for settlement in the Occupied 
Territories, and in this capacity was Chairman of 
Ministerial Committee on Settlement, a post that gave him 
greater power in the political and security sphere than 
other Ministers, who were members of the Ministerial 
Committee on Defence. And finally, in 1977, a reserve army 
officer, Brigadier-General Mordehai Zippori M.K. (Likud-
Herut), was appointed Deputy Defence Minister. With the 
dissolution of Yadin's party, the DMC, and the resignation 
of Weizman, only Sharon and Zippori joined Begin's second 
Cabinet, in 1981 !'^^ 
Despite the officers in the cabinet, there have 
been military officers in political parties who contested 
18. Yoram Peri, "Between Battles and Ballots", Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, London. New York, 1983, 
pp. 103-104. 
131 
elections not only for the Knesset (Parliament) but also 
for the post of Mayor in different places. In 1969, the 
Labour Party nominated colonel (Res.) Yosef Nevo for Mayor 
of Herzliya. Labour party again nominated several officers 
in 1973 municipal elections. In the 1977 municipal 
elections nearly fifteen officers were negotiated and -ore 
were elected. Thus, to sum up, between the War of 
Independence and 1981, "10 lieutenant-generals, sore 90 
major-generals, a similar number of brigadier-generals the 
rank was introduced only in 1968) and more than 450 colonels 
retired from the IDF of the lieutenant-generals and -ajor-
generals, no less than one third took up full-time political 
careers. Other officers from these ranks also took part in 
political activity on a less regular basis. Approxi-ately 
20 per cent of all the former senior officers from colonel 
upwards chose a political career, if the term is interpreted 
19 in the widest possible way". 
Thus, the officers who joins politics directly or 
indirectly could be divided into three categories. First 
comprises of those who participates in politics as zain 
occupation like Ministers, or elected officials in local 
authorities and the Jewish Agency. Second group comprises 
19. Ibid. , p. 105 
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of those who are engaged in part-time political activity. 
Third group holds some administrative public posts which, 
in Israel, are political in nature and the appointments are 
influenced by political considerations like Ambassadors to 
certain countries, Directors General of Ministries, heads of 
Jewish Agency departments and senior Histadurt officials 
etc. 
Military also plays a dominant role in the composi-
tion of cabinet, particularly in the selection of Defence 
Minister. In 1967, the army leaders wanted to deprive 
Eshkol of the defence portfolio, to bring Gahal and, more-
over, Rafi into the cabinet, to establish a National Ur.ity 
Coalition and to appoint Dayan as Minister of Defence. The 
army's opinion of the candidates was taken into account not 
only by opposition parliamentarians like Ben Gurion, but 
also by Eshkol and the veterans' supporters. Mapam lesder 
Yaacov Hazan consulted Chief of Staff Rabin before he 
finally decided whether to agree to Dayan's entry into ihe 
cabinet. Eshkol also discussed the matter with Rabin on ihe 
same day. The army's view of Dayan had a deep significance 
in the decisive meeting of Mapai's central committee on 
20 1 June, the day the National Unity Coalition was formed. 
20. Yitzhak Rabin, "Memoirs" (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, Maariv, 
1979 , p. 178. 
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Both before and after the May 1967 crisis, army 
officers expressed their opinion on the appointment of a 
new Defence Minister. In 1954 Ben Gurion consulted Chief 
of Staff Dayan as to who should succeed Lavon. In 1963 a 
group of generals including Rabin and Amit begged Ben 
Gurion not to resign from the cabinet. But these were not 
true parallels for May 1967, when the array was a central 
and crucial factor that brought about Dayan's inclusion in 
the cabinet. Between 14 May and 1 June 1967 the army played 
an important role in the political process. It withdrew 
confidence from the Prime Minister and Defence Minister; it 
strenuously lobbied all parties to change the Government's 
composition; it insisted that the new Defence Minister must 
be a former officer; and it calmed down only when its 
candidate was at the helm of the defence establishrnent. 
An Assessment of Civil-Military Relations: 
Four decades of civil-military relations in Israel 
shows that both are integral and fusionist. According to 
Perlmutter, an analysis for the interaction of civilian and 
military authorities should cover three aspects: one, the 
political-psychological; two, the institutional-structural; 
and three, the personal interaction and perception of the 
elites governing civil and military structures. The 
political-psychological means the political and perceptual 
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relationships between the two most authoritative heads of 
the two systems, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of 
Staff, on the whole were convergent. Since David Ben 
Gurion, no Minister of Defence has selected the Chief of 
Staff. But it all depends on the personality and style of 
the Defence Minister to which Chief of Staff have to adjust. 
David Ben Gurion wanted the subordinate role of the military 
and even he did not tolerate deviation from his norms. But 
Gen Gurion too imposed his style on IDF through Chief of 
Staff and the High Command. Ben Gurion wanted every minute 
information on even minor military operations from Dayan. 
On thS other hand Dayan was able to do what Yadin and 
Makleff could not, as he reoriented Ben Gurion's policies. 
Thus the cordial relationship between Ben Gurion and Dayan 
was the harmonious periods in the IDF-Defence Ministry 
relationships. 
Structually, the critical relationship between the 
two was on the personal level, and much of civil - military 
relations in Israel were thus dictated accordingly as 
follows: 
1. The degree of accessibility of the Chief of 
Staff to the Defence Minister and, inversely; 
2. the scope and degree of the Minister's inter-
vention in the structural and institutional 
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practices of the IDF, but especially of the 
High Command; and, 
3. the respect that the Defence Minister held for 
the professionalism of the Chief of Staff. 
The evolution of the structural relationship 
between the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and the 
Chief of Staff, was cyclical. During Ben Gurion, authority 
flowed from his undisputed and charismatic personality 
rather than his combined job as Prime Minister and Defence 
Minister. But this was no longer possible to the successors 
of Ben Gurion, for example, Lavon, Eshkol, Dayan and Peres. 
The inability of Lavon, the first Defence Minister after 
Ben Gurion, to implement his authority over IDF was not due 
to the separation of the portfolio of Defence Minister from 
the Prime Ministership but his personal inability to impose 
the necessary authority over an ambitious Chief of Staff and 
a contemptuous High Command. 
Eshkol, like Ben Gurion, also assumed joint 
authority, Prime Minister as well as Defence Minister, but 
he could not exercise his authority over IDF to the extent 
of Ben Gurion and left the Chief of Staff Rabin and High 
Command to work on their o\m. IDF did not persuade Eshkol 
who wanted for an early pre-emptive attack on the Arab 
states in the crucial days between May 15 and June 5, 1967 
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until early in June when his cabinet was ready to pre-empt. 
Dayan, on the other hand, who was the Defence Minister in 
1973 war, not only had a considerable influence on the 
Golda Meir but also over-ruled Chief of Staff Elazar's call 
for the mobilizing of a greater part of the IDF a few days 
before the Egyptian-Syrian forces were ready for the 
surprise attack of October 6, 1973. Thus, Dayan dominated 
the IDF but at the same time gave it a considerable 
leverage and autonomy. Chief of Staff, Gur, was neverthe-
less responsible to the Defence Minister and the cabinet. 
Gur also had considerable weight in cabinet decisions in 
case of a crisis. But Gur too was over-ruled on several 
crucial military-political decisions. Thus Gur was not 
powerful than key cabinet officers, but was more powerful 
than former Chiefs of Staff in the area of national 
security policy. 
Thus, in a state under garrison conditions, it is 
not possible to establish simple forraalistic lines of demar-
cation between the different functions of national security, 
its different structures, and, above all, of the type of 
personality - authority relationships that develop. The 
above combinations are not sinply superordination - subor-
dination relationships. But, personal, institutional and 
structural - bureaucratic relationships dictate civil-
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military relations in Israel as they do in other democratic 
systems, especially the U.S. which is the political and 
military power of the Western World. 
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C O N C L U S I O N S 
The pre-eminent concern of Israeli policy-makers and 
Israelis in general is with national survival and security 
as a result of its conflict with its Arab neighbours and its 
geo-strategic situation. Before the creation of Israel there 
was a civil war like situation in Palestine. When the state 
of Israel was established, it immediately fought a regular 
war against the neighbouring Arab States. Israel won the 
war, but victory brought no peace - not then, not since. 
On the contrary, the unexpected success only stimulated its 
defeated enemies as well as Israel to try to husband better 
their superior military resources with a view to another 
round and another, and thus signaled the beginning of a 
confrontation that has still not ceased, -ore than four 
decades later. In the process, the confrontation became 
embroiled in the ups and downs of pan-Arab politics and 
inter-Arab rivalries, and got entangled with the changing 
patterns of super power competition and the fluctuations of 
relations within the world alliance systems. 
Israel perceives some specific threats to its 
security. The unsettled borders; the threat from 
Palestinian Fedyeen; the emergent chenical weapons 
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programme in the Arab World, notably Iraq and Libya and the 
growing Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Israel tried 
to tackle the border problems by expanding its frontiers and 
creating new Jewish settlements along the border. 
Two stages may be clearly distinguished to the 
security problems that confronted Israel. Right after the 
War of Independence, the challenge Israel faced was to 
husband its limited resources and to use them in such a way 
as to deter any Arab coalition from going to war. In this, 
Israel succeeded brilliantly, especially in the 1957-1967 
periods. In the latter years, however, a series of 
accidents combined to deceive Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser 
about Israel's real strength in comparison with the forces 
at his command and drove him to precipitate war. 
The failure of Israel to deter its enemies impelled 
Israel to revise its basic strategy and seek to use the 
assets it had gained in the war to achieve security through 
forcing a favourable peace settlement. This switch to a 
strategy of "compellence" involved a much greater admixture 
of the political with the military than had the previous 
strategy of deterrence. In dealing with the military 
aspects of the problem, which assumed the novel forms of a 
war of attrition, guerrilla action, and terrorism, Israel 
did veil, although not as brilliantly as in the previous 
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stages. However, an uneven and generally mediocre handling 
of the political aspects of the strategy denied it the 
success it might have achieved and impelled the Arabs to 
gamble on a surprise general war rather than yield to open-
ended demands. The impressive recovery of the military from 
the initial blunders of the 1973 Yom Kippur war prevented a 
complete failure of the compellence strategy. It remains to 
be seen, however, how long Israel can preserve what was 
salvaged, and, especially, how intelligent will be the 
handling of its political aspects in future. 
The growth of Israel's military power during the 
years has extended to many other areas and was compounded by 
many qualitative improvements in organization, training, 
command and control, and so on, but the examples cited 
suggest the extent of Israel's effort to build up and 
maintain the means to support a strategy of total deterrence, 
However, as events were to show, the Israeli strategic 
design had two flaws that proved to be its undoing. The 
total military superiority necessary to a strategy of total 
deterrence was almost inherently impossible for Israel to 
achieve because the bulk of its military establishment 
depended on reserves while the enemy's rested on standing 
forces. As long as that was the case there were bound to be 
moments and situations in which superiority was actually or 
could be on the side of the enemy. However, in theory, 
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they offered the enemy opportunities and openings that 
undermined absolute deterrence. 
Post 1973 war period brought many questions before 
Israel as how to close the gap which the Arabs exploited so 
well between Israel's standing and mobilizable strengths? 
How to prevent a possible repetition of long and costly 
warfare and restore the possibility of open operations and 
rapid decision right from the outset of hostilities? And 
how to keep a favourable relation of forces in the face of 
plausible Arab war coalitions endowed with vastly superior 
resources? Thus to meet these challenges. Israel responded 
as : 
1. Improvement of the means of intelligence gathering 
and diversification of the intelligence evaluation appara-
tus, according to recommendations of the Agranat Inquiry 
Commission. 
2. Striving to establish through the negotiations for 
disengagement of forces that took place immediately after 
the war of a variety of tripwire and early warning arrange-
ments, such as limited forces zones, UN buffer areas, and 
electronic monitoring stations with American participation. 
3. Striving to endow standing forces with a capacity to 
launch a substantial pre-emptive stike by themselves, without 
awaiting the reserves, if necessary and vith the means to 
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undertake prompt counter offensive operations even while 
containing an enemy first strike, if he should succeed again 
in gaining surprise. 
4. Expanding the total size of the military establish-
ment to the maximum limit permitted by the size of the 
manpower pool. Thus, by lightening military service 
regulations, drawing upon previously exempt categories, and 
reordering functions and assignments to permit effective 
use of low qualification manpower in secondary tasks, 
Israel was able to increase the total size of its mobiliz-
able forces to 600,000 men and women. 
5. Raising the level of personnel skills, reducing the 
differential between second - and first-line formations, and 
improving command and control in the context of reorganizing 
the forces in army corps formations. 
6. Above all, in order to endow the standing forces 
with a first strike and counter-offensive capacity and to 
counter the superior resources of plausible Arab coalitions, 
striving to extend to the utmost limit the qualitative 
superiority of the weapons and equipment of all the armed 
forces. This endeavour is partly reflected in efforts to 
acquire from the United States and develop locally the 
finest combat aircraft, the most advanced ECM (electronic 
counter measure) equipment, missiles fired from ground and 
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sea platforms, standoff weapons launched from aircraft 
outside the range of air defence, guided bombs and drones 
directed from the air or ground launchers, ballistic 
missiles and varieties of anti-tank missiles, and so on. 
To pursue its 1973 post-war defence effort Israel 
had to strain its economic resources to the utmost. Direct 
and indirect defence expenditures in 1974 and 1975 amounted 
to 36 per cent of GNP, nearly double the pre-war level. 
Even so, Israel had to depend to a decisive extent on 
increased American assistance. In the first three years 
after the Six Day War, for instance, American military 
assistance to Israel averaged about $ 40 million a year - a 
very small proportion of its total defence expenditures. 
In the next three years, it averaged about $ 400 million -
close to 28 per cent of total defence expenditures. In 
1974-75 the American contribution averaged $ 1.5 billion -
fully 42 per cent of Israel's defence spending. In addition, 
the United States had been virtually the only supply source 
for the high technology sophisticated weapons that have 
become the mainstay of Israel's post war strategy. But the 
United States' willingness to provide that kind of help has 
been bound with an evolving conception of shared American-
Israeli interests. Consequently, continuation of that aid, 
and therefore of Israel's ability to pursue its defence 
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strategy, will inevitably be limited by the ability of the 
two countries to continue to accommodate each other in the 
face of changing circumstances. 
On the question of the relationship between the 
civilian and the military, Israel's record has so far been 
clean of direct intrusion of the military into politics in 
any form remotely resembling the ventures of the armed 
forces into the politics of Turkey or of France in the late 
1950s, not to speak of the multitude of Third World 
countries - where the military have openly assumed power as 
for example in Pakistan or in Bengladesh. Israel since its 
very establishment has a tradition of democratically elected 
governments to rule itself, where military men have fought 
elections and got elected to many government positions, 
however, there has been not even a remote attempt on the 
part of armed forces to topple the democratically elected 
government. 
Former military men in politics may not necessarily 
feel solidarity among themselves, but they do retain 
connections with colleagues still in the armed forces that 
may allow them to exert active or passive nexus and 
influences. The prospect of former generals conniving with 
active officers to use the arned forces under their command 
to affect a take over of the government is so remote to 
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consider it a threat. However, the possibility exists of 
retired officers' influencing active ones to bend the use of 
military force in the course of legitimate duty in ways 
designed to serve particular political convictions that they 
share. This, though still remote, is not so improbable. 
The impact of the Israeli defence establishment on 
its society are too intricate that it is difficult in any 
case to isolate the influence of this factor on Israeli 
culture from the multitude of other forces affecting it. 
All that can be said here with certainty is that the defence 
endeavour has absorbed into its military and civilian 
establishments a very high proportion of the best minds and 
energies, as well as large chunks of the country's economic 
resources, and to that extent the cultural political growth 
of Israel has not been realized as fully as it might have 
been. 
The overwhelming concentration on defence and 
concern with war have deflected much of the nations best 
human and material resources from the cultivation of the 
good life as visualized by Israel's founders, and that they 
have sown the seeds of alien growths which began to manifest 
themselves in dangerous magnitudes after 1967. There exist 
the beginnings of a military - industrial complex, which, as 
everywhere, has a natural vested interest in maxinizing 
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military investment. This, together with the propensity of 
Israelis, as part of a people that had been the victim of 
power, to hoard power for its own sake, threatens to turn 
the defence effort from a means of survival into an end in 
itself. At the same time, the development of an irredentist 
movement feeding on mystical nationalism in connection with 
territories conquered in war portends the beginnings of a 
tendency wherein power, even though defensive in origin, 
generates emotional needs to justify its further application 
and political situations to justify its further expansion. 
These interrelated influences make up a vicious circle that 
could set Israel on a career which might prove self destruc-
tive in the longer run. The Yom Kippur war may have checked 
some of these influences at least, but only a durable peace 
between Israel and its neighbours can definitely neutralize 
them and reverse the vicious circle. The chances of such a 
peace can only be assessed in the light of the international 
politics affecting Israel, especially the relations between 
Israel and the United States. 
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